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PREFACE 
hroughout Europe, the financial crisis of 2008 and the implementation 
of new regulations have contributed to a reversal in the continuous 
growth in outstanding consumer credit registered in the preceding 
decade, thereby resulting in a cumulative contraction of more than 10% over 
the last five years in the euro area. The prospect of the American subprime 
crisis contaminating Europe, the banking fragilities it revealed, and the 
resulting loss of household confidence in the economy led to the double 
phenomenon of persistent contraction in the demand for loans and 
reinforced banking regulation, prompting banks to reduce their balance 
sheets. In combination with growing ecological concerns, resulting in the 
need for more responsible consumer behaviour, this major crisis may have 
been a good opportunity to initiate a broad movement calling into question 
our growth model, in order to tend to the ‘sobriété heureuse’ defended by the 
French writer, farmer and environmentalist Pierre Rabhi.  
Nevertheless, GDP growth remains the main benchmark for assessing 
the overall success of an economy. Furthermore, the European banking 
system has been forced to adjust its internal models in order, on the one 
hand, to adapt to increasingly constraining regulation and, on the other 
hand, to meet the request from the European Central Bank and governments 
to support European economic growth by increasing the supply of credit. 
Nevertheless, the amounts of consumer credit granted remain far below pre-
2008 levels. Yet the outstanding sum of consumer credit is not likely to pose 
the systemic risk that is much feared at the macroeconomic level. On the 
other hand, rising household over-indebtedness throughout Europe reveals 
that strengthening regulation does not reduce the risk of household 
insolvency and that new approaches need to be defined to contain the 
unacceptable social risk which, to a certain extent, contributes to the 
dangerous increase of political extremism observed in all EU-28 member 
states.  
Current economic, technological and social developments seem to 
justify reviving the consumer credit market so it can play an active role in 
achieving the ambitious Europe 2020 agenda: promoting responsible and 
T
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sustainable growth, respecting the environment and human welfare, and 
implementing the transition to renewable energy sources. Public investment 
alone will not be sufficient to achieve these ambitious and necessary 
objectives. Europeans themselves have to be encouraged to take part in this 
project, by adjusting their consumption habits. From that perspective, credit, 
in combination with appropriate tax policies, can provide a powerful 
leverage to fund new forms of consumption in line with responsible growth.  
The stance of this report therefore consists of identifying the channels 
through which regulators can revive consumer credit markets – which are, 
undeniably, tools for European growth – and, in the meantime, in ensuring 
sufficient consumer protection, as it remains one of the founding principles 
of every public policy. 
While the transposition of the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) 
has not decreased the heterogeneity in domestic rules across member states 
– it has in fact done the opposite – today it remains difficult, although 
necessary, to assess good practices and the impact of stricter regulation on 
the evolution and dynamics of this market. Indeed, national practices in 
terms of regulation depend significantly on domestic cultural behaviour and 
socio-economic conditions, thereby resulting in few possibilities to make 
pertinent comparisons between countries. How can European regulation on 
credit be harmonised without harmonising the definition of the different 
credit products available in each country and establishing a common 
classification of the diverse technical features of credit, all against the 
economic backdrop of debt ratios ranging from 1 to 3, depending on the 
country? How can we regulate effectively when we cannot precisely define 
what we are supposed to regulate?   
On the other hand, the stricter regulation observed in several countries, 
including France and Italy, has triggered a public debate over and tarnished 
the image of consumer credit, thereby heightening the sector’s poor 
performance. 
In addition, the difficulty of harmonising European regulation also 
results from the difficulty of integrating the domestic markets within a 
European single market. The main reason behind this challenge can be found 
in the fact that consumer credit is usually related to the purchase of a 
physical good, which remains an essentially local decision from a 
geographical point of view, except when e-commerce is involved. By 
incorporating the cultural dimension of borrowers’ relationship to money 
(which differs greatly across countries) and the risk -management challenges 
facing lenders (assessing their borrowers’ creditworthiness and their own 
TOWARDS A BALANCED CONTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY | iii 
capacity to cover costs in case of default), we can understand why cross-
border lending remains marginal, excluding Luxembourg. 
As a result, stimulating consumer credit markets in Europe is probably 
best achieved by finding ways to simplify local rules and implement a new 
type of regulation, taking into consideration the complexities of the market 
and the development of e-commerce, the new risks related to digital 
development and new business models. The legal complexity of consumer 
credit contracts are obvious proof of the consequences of regulation, which 
ends up being counterproductive for both the lender (rising administrative 
costs) and the borrower (incomprehensible, and often unread, contractual 
clauses). Digitising contracts should contribute to the simplification and 
gradual harmonisation of both pre-contractual and contractual documents.   
Therefore, the recovery of consumer credit markets will be intimately 
linked to the ability of banks and financial organisations to build a customer 
relationship based on a better balance of responsibilities, and to take 
advantage of new information technologies and uses of digital tools. Success 
will also depend on the ability of regulators, especially those at the EU level, 
to favour the emergence of regulations that both accompany the 
development of credit and guarantee the protection of consumers. The 
recovery would rely on dynamic processes (such as ‘trial & error’), favouring 
the emergence of good practices in each country and then testing and 
assessing the impact of a new policy before implementing it at the national 
level. Finally, it may be feasible for the existing regulator to supervise 
agencies of social and environmental ratings, whose objectives would be to 
certify the quality of the credit and the behaviour of stakeholders in each 
country. 
In this respect, this report defends the emergence of a new type of 
European regulation – meaning better, not more, regulation – that fuels 
growth, protects consumers and enhances the balance of responsibility 
between borrowers and lenders. 
Eric Delannoy 
Chairman of the Task Force  
 Former Vice President, Weave 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
hile policy-makers are creating conditions to strengthen recovery, 
the debate on the role that retail finance should play in this respect 
focuses on corporate loans rather than on household credit. The 
improvement of financing conditions for firms in order to support further 
investment spending is certainly essential to ensuring sustainable growth. 
However, a significant part of EU growth will depend on the behaviour of 
households and on their ability to secure funding for their consumption and 
investment. It is therefore essential to place further emphasis on the different 
options available to stimulate household credit, in particular consumer 
loans.1  
Nevertheless, in order to avoid past mistakes, regulators should 
continue to develop a framework where consumer loans (and by extension 
household credit) contributes to the economy in a balanced way. To achieve 
this, five main issues need to be further addressed.2 Firstly, more 
harmonisation in statistics is required to support the policy process. 
Secondly, the macroeconomic models used to boost consumer loans should 
be refined, both in a quantitative and qualitative way. Thirdly and in parallel, 
innovative tools should be developed to try to deal with persistent and new 
market dysfunctions for household credit, especially in the areas of 
                                                   
1 Although the core of the report places the focus on consumer credit (loans granted 
to households for personal use in the consumption of goods and services), most of 
the recommendations could concern the other types of household loans (including 
residential loans and other loans). In addition, several analytical frameworks may 
be partially or totally replicated in all the segments of household credit, especially 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
2 The intention of the report is to adopt a multidisciplinary approach by using 
methodological tools from different disciplines: macroeconomics, microeconomics, 
behavioural economics, statistics, finance and consumer protection/competition 
laws. In that context, as shown in the table at the end of this executive summary, 
recommendations can be of use to policy-makers and senior executives, as well as to 
researchers, statisticians and economists. 
W
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information disclosure requirements and responsible lending practices. 
Fourthly, at a more European level, better understanding of the integration 
process of household credit is required. Finally, regulators need to create 
conditions aimed at supporting the financial sector throughout its digital 
transition process.    
1. Greater harmonisation in statistical methodologies 
At the beginning of all policy initiatives, regulators need accurate, consistent 
and verifiable data which help define the scope covered by the enacted rules. 
Furthermore, the consistency of statistics is imperative to conduct effective 
impact assessment of existing and future European policies.  
In the current state of play, we find that more harmonisation is 
necessary in statistical methodologies across countries and over time for 
consumer loans. Special attention should be drawn to the classification of 
certain types of products included in consumer loan markets (notably the 
overdraft). 
2. A balanced contribution to economic growth  
Between 2010 and 2013, the average annual real GDP growth in the EU 
reached +0.4%, namely 2.2 percentage points (pp) below its long-term 
average (see 1996-2007 in the table below), while it stood at +2.0% in the US 
(1.2 pp below its long-term average). This significant transatlantic output 
gap in 2010-13 was primarily the result of differentiated contributions from 
private consumption of households: only -0.1 pp in the EU-28 (vs. +1.4 pp in 
1996-07) and +1.9 pp in the US (vs. +2.4 pp in 1996-07).3  
This very poor performance of private consumption in the EU-28 
(resulting in subdued economic growth) is likely to be partly explained by 
the collapse observed in outstanding consumer loans (a cumulative -17.6% 
in 2010-13 vs. +15.2% in 2004-07, while US cumulative figures stood at +6.8% 
and +12.4%, respectively). In that context, further research needs to be 
conducted at European level to better understand, on the one hand, the 
interactions between consumer credit markets and economic growth and, on 
                                                   
3 Considering the evolution of disposable income, the average private consumption 
to household disposable income ratio (DPCI) observed in 2010-13 was below its 
long-term annual average (1995-07) in the majority of EU-15 countries for which data 
are available. These figures confirm the poor performance of private consumption 
in 2010-13.  
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the other hand, the drivers behind the dynamics in consumer credit markets. 
Such studies should concentrate on the main factors shaping lending 
standards and the demand for consumer loans. As shown in this report, the 
former has been determined to a large extent by bank balance sheet 
constraints, costs of funds and risk perception of banks, whereas the latter 
has been markedly influenced by consumer confidence levels and household 
preference for saving.4  
 
Developments in consumer loan markets and key macroeconomic variables 
 EU-28 US 
Period 1996-07  2004-07 2010-13 1996-07 2004-07 2010-13 
Outstanding consumer 
loans (yearly average 
real growth) 
+7.9% +4.8% -6.2% +4.2% +2.2% +4.0% 
Real private 
consumption (yearly 
average contribution to 
real GDP growth) 
+1.4 pp. +1.3 pp. -0.1 pp. 2.4 pp. +2.0 pp. +1.5 pp. 
Real GDP (average 
yearly growth) 
+2.6% +2.8% +0.4%  +3.2% +2.6% +2.0% 
Source: ECRI Statistical Package and Eurostat. 
On the policy side, quantitative easing in monetary policy aimed at 
strengthening the very recent economic recovery through the ‘credit 
channel’ should be pursued in the EU (quantitative approach). However, the 
policy framework used for quantitative easing needs to be refined in order 
to better control for the possible harmful effects of abundant liquidity on 
long-term financial stability. One option to consider for this purpose is to 
integrate and emphasise constraints mirroring “socially acceptable levels of 
macroeconomic risk” in macroeconomic models designed to conduct the 
monetary and macro-prudential policies.5  
                                                   
4  The high preference for saving recorded in 2010-13 is reflected by the low levels of 
PCDI, as many households needed to rebuild their balance sheets notably by 
substituting saving for private consumption.  
5 For microfounded macroeconomic models, policy-makers should keep in mind 
that it is necessary to maintain a satisfactory level of standard deviation of 
microeconomic risks, in order to ensure sufficient diversity in the conduct of retail 
financial businesses. 
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Finally, the role of private consumption in the ‘energy transition’ 
process should be studied more in depth (qualitative approach). The 
purchase of ecologically designed final products on a large scale is likely to 
contribute appreciably to achieving some of the objectives of the Europe 2020 
strategy, especially in terms of carbon reduction targets. Further research is 
necessary to assess which role consumer loans might play in that context. 
Should well-founded studies confirm the positive role of consumer loans in 
the ‘energy transition’ process, regulators could develop some tools to 
encourage households to fund these purchases through loans (such as via 
tax breaks). 
3. A reinforced policy framework for information disclosure 
requirements 
Regulators should ensure better enforcement of existing European rules for 
information disclosure requirements. Regarding future policies, information 
disclosure requirements at the advertising stage, pre-contractual stage and 
contractual stage need to be reasonable in quantity, easily understood by 
consumers and targeted primarily towards the main needs of consumers.  
On the research side, some analyses need to be conducted on the 
optimal amount of information that consumers are prepared to take into 
consideration. Researchers should also continue to study the impact of 
different types of information on the ability of consumers to make optimal 
choices. More specifically, some studies should consider types of 
information that are easier to understand than the annual percentage rate 
(APR). The use of the latest findings in behavioural insights literature should 
help in that respect, particularly by considering the most relevant 
behavioural biases for policy design. 
4. Some reflections on the promotion of responsible lending practices 
In order to help alleviate the harmful effects of over-indebtedness for both 
borrowers and lenders, further emphasis should be placed on the prevention 
of this phenomenon, notably by encouraging the set-up of early-stage 
detection of potential financial difficulties of the borrower to reimburse his 
loan. The enhancement of such practices should be made through the use of 
regulatory incentives (such as tax deductibility or some easing in the 
implementation of CRD4 price-based ratios). This would avoid the 
significant risk of binding regulation leading to negative outcomes that 
could easily outweigh any positive effects. 
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Responsible lending practices might also be promoted through the use 
of external assessments performed by independent bodies. However, if not 
adequately calibrated, these assessments might result in regulatory overlaps, 
given that supervisory controls have already been reinforced in the context 
of the new regulatory packages. Therefore, more studies and surveys will be 
needed before deciding if the use of independent external assessments 
would become a viable option. 
5. Further research on integration processes of retail financial markets  
Further research needs to be conducted, firstly, on the impact of rising 
financial integration on consumer protection and credit/economic growth 
and, secondly, on the determination of an optimal level of integration, 
especially to assess the implied costs of further integration. More specifically, 
some in-depth studies should be conducted on the different channels for 
integration and the two main types of drivers behind them (macroeconomic 
developments and domestic rules). 
Regarding specific methodologies, analytical frameworks should be 
developed to help compare the level of harmonisation in domestic rules 
between ‘before domestic implementation of a European regulation’ and 
‘after domestic implementation of this regulation’. Such frameworks should 
be flexible enough to be applied to the whole scope of financial services. 
Finally, some indexes based on microeconomic tools (such as surveys) 
should be put in place to mirror the level of financial market integration.   
6. Accompanying the financial sector throughout its digital transition 
process 
Regarding the use of new digital tools in the sector of household credit, 
regulators should consider digital processing as a channel for reinforcing 
European integration of retail financial services. In particular, some 
European regulations such as the Electronic Identification and Trust Services 
(eIDAS) Regulation need to be adequately enforced at member state level. 
Also, the interoperability of such rules across the different organisations, 
financial institutions (FIs)6 and public authorities, both within and between 
                                                   
6 The scope covered by financial institutions is provided in a footnote in the Glossary 
of Abbreviations in Appendix 1. 
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countries, is necessary for the effective set-up of an integrated digital market 
of retail financial services.7 
Finally, rapid development of new business models such as 
crowdfunding platforms requires the production of adequate data on their 
volume of activities and types of services. The development of consistent 
data across countries and over time is essential, if EU regulators decide to 
design a European regulation tailored to these new entrants on the market.  
 
Summary of the Task Force’s policy recommendations  
Code Recommendations Of use to: 
Chapter 2. Scope and market assessment 
2.2.1 Define an optimal benefit to cost ratio of a regulation, 
corresponding to a specific segmentation of the 
regulated products 
-Researchers   
-Economists 
2.2.2 Promote the harmonisation of the legal and 
statistical approaches in the determination of the 
scope for consumer credit, in order to have 
consistent data that can adequately reflect the scope 
of products of the CCD  
-Statisticians 
2.3.1 Promote the analysis of macroeconomic drivers 
behind the dynamics and trends in consumer loan 
markets 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
2.3.2 Promote the harmonisation of statistical breakdowns 
of consumer loans by products across the EU-28 + 
EEA 
-Statisticians 
2.3.3 Enhance the development of strong methodologies 
to study the impact of specific regulations on the 
dynamism of household credit markets 
-Researchers 
-Economists 
-Statisticians 
Chapter 3. Growth approach 
3.1.1 Promote consumer credit as a tool to boost 
macroeconomic private consumption and, as a 
consequence, real GDP growth. Consumer credit can 
play a noticeable role in the economic recovery in the 
EU-28 + EEA 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
                                                   
7 Interoperability describes a situation where the different organisations involved 
are able to exchange and make use of information. 
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Code Recommendations Of use to: 
3.1.2 Promote research on the interactions between the 
dynamics in consumer credit markets and economic 
growth 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
3.1.3 Promote research on the effect of the regulations of 
price-based ratios on the dynamics in household 
retail financial products such as consumer loans 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
3.1.4 Integrate and emphasise constraints reflecting 
‘socially acceptable levels of macroeconomic risk’ in 
macroeconomic models designed to conduct the 
monetary and macro-prudential policies8  
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
-Economists 
-Researchers 
3.1.5 Reinforce the consistency in the statistical 
measurement of over-indebtedness across the EU-28 
member states + EEA 
-Statisticians 
3.1.6 Develop practical tools to evaluate possible over-
indebtedness (for example, by considering four key 
aspects of over-indebtedness: cost of servicing debt, 
being in arrears, number of loans/heavy use of 
credit and subjective perception of burden) 
-Statisticians 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
3.2.1 Study the role of private consumption in the ‘energy 
transition’ process upheld by the Europe 2020 
strategy and assess which role consumer loans could 
play in that context 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
Chapter 4. Consumer protection approach 
4.1.1 Promote further enforcement of the CCD, especially 
regarding advertised cost information with a 
representative example 
-Policy-makers 
-Business 
Decision-makers 
4.1.2 Enhance the design and implementation of future 
policies where the information disclosure 
requirements at the advertising stage, pre-
contractual stage and contractual stage should be 
reasonable in quantity, easily understood by most 
consumers and targeted primarily towards the main 
needs of consumers 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
                                                   
8 For microfounded macroeconomic models, policy-makers should keep in mind 
that it is necessary to maintain a satisfactory level of standard deviation of 
microeconomic risk. 
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Code Recommendations Of use to: 
4.1.3 Overall, promote further research into the optimum 
amount and structure of informational material that 
consumers are prepared to take into consideration 
when deciding on financial products, particularly 
consumer loans 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
 
4.1.4 Enhance the use by regulators and FIs of a specific 
ranking for each type of customer need in terms of 
information, in order to reinforce the efficiency of 
policies based on information disclosure  
-Researchers     
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
4.1.5 Promote the use of more simple tools than APR to 
help customers compare the different financial 
services available  
-Researchers     
-Economists 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
4.1.6 Promote the use of relevant warnings in the 
disclosed information 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
4.2.1 Place further emphasis on the prevention of over-
indebtedness, notably by encouraging the set-up of 
early-stage detection of potential over-indebtedness 
in order to alleviate collection/juridical costs of FIs 
and arrears and perhaps bankruptcy costs of 
households 
-Statisticians 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
4.2.2 Use regulatory incentives (such as tax deductibility 
and some easing in the implementation of CRD4 
price-based ratios). This would avoid the significant 
risk that binding regulation would lead to negative 
outcomes that could easily outweigh any positive 
effects. 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
4.3.1 Assess the possibility of conducting a survey on the 
different practices in terms of external assessment of 
responsible lending practices of FIs in the different 
European member states 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
-Researchers 
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Chapter 5. Integration, consumer protection and growth 
5.1.1 Promote research on the impact of further financial 
integration on consumer protection and growth and 
on the determination of an optimal level of 
integration, thereby assessing in particular the 
implied costs of further integration 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
5.1.2 Develop different channels to enhance integration of 
retail financial markets and assess which ones are the 
most effective 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
5.1.3 Develop impact assessments whose main purpose is 
to compare the level of European harmonisation in 
household credit rules between ‘before the domestic 
implementation of the regulation’ and ‘after the 
implementation of the regulation’. Such 
methodologies need to be sufficiently flexible to be 
applied to other segments of retail finance and even 
beyond. 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
5.1.4 Highlight the limits of the indicators of cross-border 
standard deviation of FIs interest rates on retail loans 
(CBSD) in the measurement of the intensity of 
integration in household credits 
-Statisticians 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
5.1.5 Promote a microeconomic approach, notably based 
on surveys with FIs or households, to give a better 
estimate on the evolution of integration across 
domestic household credit markets 
-Statisticians 
 
5.2.1 Promote the idea that the development of cross-
border lending would make sense as a policy 
objective only if a certain degree of regulatory and 
tax harmonisation is achieved 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
5.3.1 Promote the idea that the prerequisite for further 
integration through cross-border M&A is economic 
growth 
-Policy-makers 
- Senior 
Executives 
5.3.2 Promote research on the main regulatory drivers 
behind cross-border M&As 
-Researchers     
-Economists 
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Chapter 6. Digital banking and new/related business models 
6.1.1 Consider digital processing as a channel to reinforce 
European integration of retail financial services 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
6.1.2 Strengthen the enforcement of the eIDAS at member 
state level 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
6.1.3 Enhance the interoperability of the eIDAS across the 
different organisations, FIs and public authorities, 
both within and between member states 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
6.1.4 Avoid overly prescriptive new legislation 
particularly in the field of electronic banking in order 
to not stifle the development of innovative new 
products. Promote research on how regulation can 
achieve the optimal balance between trust and 
innovation. 
-Policy-makers 
-Researchers 
6.2.1 Enhance the production of consistent data across the 
EU-28 on the aggregate activities of new banking 
business models 
-Statisticians 
6.2.2 Promote the enactment of a European regulation 
tailored to crowdfunding business models, once the 
market using these new business models has reached 
a critical mass, likely to spark noticeable systemic 
risks 
-Policy-makers 
-Senior 
Executives 
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CHAPTER 1. SETTING THE SCENE: 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TOWARDS 
CONSUMER LOANS 
Background 
While a significant part of current domestic and European economic policies 
aim at improving the conditions for a sustained recovery, the debate on the 
role that retail finance should play in this respect focuses on loans to non-
financial corporations9 rather than on credit to households. The 
improvement of financing conditions for firms in order to support further 
investment spending is certainly essential to ensuring sustainable growth; 
however, a significant part of EU growth will depend on the behaviour of 
households and on their ability to find funding for their consumption and 
investment. As a result, this Task Force has decided to focus on the latter 
element of retail credit.  
The credit channel through which retail finance can fund private 
consumption is principally consumer credit. This specific lending segment is 
often underestimated, partly owing to the value of its stocks which are 
generally significantly below the outstanding value of residential loans. 
Nevertheless, due to rather low maturities and very flexible products, the 
yearly flows of new businesses in consumer credit markets are high in 
comparison with many other segments of household retail finance.10  
Consumer credit markets include many diversified retail products, are 
relatively flexible and volatile and remain the most receptive household 
lending activity to new technologies and products. In addition, notably 
owing to the economic crisis and rising unemployment, these markets 
trigger a significant proportion of the over-indebted households. Finally, due 
                                                   
9 A non-financial corporation is a corporation or quasi-corporation that is not 
engaged in financial intermediation but is active primarily in the production of 
market goods and non-financial services. 
10 For example, in the UK, new business of consumer credit represents on average 
more than one-third of new business of residential loans in the period Q1 2009-Q1 
2014. Considering the period Q2 1993-Q1 2014, the figure reaches 44.4%. The 
corresponding figure for the French consumer credit market in Q1 2009-Q1 2014 is 
42.5%.  
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to their diversity and accessibility for a wide range of households (including 
the most vulnerable), consumer loans have almost continuously been at the 
centre of regulatory concerns. In that context, consumer loans have raised 
numerous questions in relation to disciplines as diverse as microeconomics 
(notably behavioural economics), macroeconomics (including national 
accountancy and monetary policies), statistics, consumer rights law and 
philosophy (notably regarding ethics). 
This being the case, some of the thoughts and recommendations 
developed by this Task Force in relation to consumer credit markets could 
provide food for thought for other retail segments. Some specific topics 
addressed by the Task Force, such as the future integration of household 
credit markets and the questions on consumer protection, will inevitably 
embrace a broader scope of activities and will also help enrich the debate on 
the future contribution of retail finance in general to the European economy. 
Consumer credit is a complex market whose analysis and monitoring 
can be approached through different perspectives. As such, the 
methodologies used to study its effects and drivers can differ significantly: 
some policy-makers will focus primarily on the growth impact of consumer 
credits, while some others will give priority to consumer protection.   
Growth approach 
The growth approach of consumer credit is twofold. Firstly, the quantitative 
approach is based on national accounts methodologies and, in recent years, 
has often advocated retail credit expansion. Within this approach, policy-
makers typically adopt the expenditure approach of GDP by emphasising 
the interactions between consumer credit and aggregate private 
consumption of households. The second approach places the focus on the 
qualitative side of economic growth (qualitative approach) and might fall 
notably within the scope of the Europe 2020 strategy and its targets in terms 
of low-carbon economy.  
Within the quantitative approach, although few studies have 
demonstrated it, consumer credit is generally considered to have a marked 
impact on private consumption of households, which remained by far the 
main contributor to real GDP in the EU-28 (between 2000 and 2013, on 
average, private consumption of households contributed to 57.8% of the real 
GDP in the EU-28). However, the contribution of private consumption to real 
GDP growth since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008-09 has been 
very poor, resulting in very low macroeconomic performances.  
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Between 2010 and 2013, the cumulative real GDP growth reached 
+1.2% in the EU-28 (down from +8.6% in the pre-crisis period of 2004-07); on 
the other hand, it stood at +6.1% in the US (vs. 8.0% in 2004-07). This 
significant transatlantic output gap in 2010-13 is essentially the result of 
differentiated contributions from private consumption of households: -0.4 
percentage points (pp.) in the EU-28 (vs. +4.0% in 2004-07) and +4.6% in the 
USA (vs. +6.1% in 2004-07). In the meantime, the outstanding real amount of 
consumer credit contracted by -17.6% in the EU-28, while it increased by 
+12.4% in the US. This substantial differentiated development of consumer 
credit across the Atlantic in 2010-13 showcases the relations between 
consumer loans and the final expenditure of households.  
Therefore, in the current context where the main aim of a significant 
part of EU macroeconomic policies is to foster a robust and sustainable 
economic recovery for the coming years, the role of the consumer credit 
market in the dynamism of household private consumption, the different 
channels and senses of causalities between both consumer credit and 
aggregate private consumption, and the factors shaping the demand and 
supply of consumer loans need to be carefully assessed.  
On the other hand, the qualitative approach of growth places emphasis 
on the type of growth sparked by consumer credit. In other words, the 
regulators consider the type of products consumed through credit, rather 
than the overall volume of consumption supported by loans. Given that few 
policy initiatives have been taken to use consumer credit as a tool to achieve 
sustainable growth in an efficient and balanced manner, the present report 
will try to design some recommendations in that direction. The qualitative 
approach can be linked to the concept of sustainable growth, notably in the 
context of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Consumer protection approach 
The consumer protection approach conducted at European or national level 
mostly intends to correct the different dysfunctions that might occur in the 
structure of household credit markets and that might lead to market failures. 
In recent decades, this approach has increasingly tried to alleviate the 
negative effects resulting from two types of market dysfunctions: 
information asymmetries between distributors/originators and borrowers 
and behavioural biases of borrowers.  
Asymmetric information can be present on both the lender and the 
borrower side. Owing to their greater experience and knowledge of the 
financial products they are in charge of selling, lenders are expected to have 
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more information on the different features of the products than consumers. 
As a consequence, they might have some incentives to exploit existing 
asymmetries of information to boost sales to the detriment of consumers 
(moral hazard). On the other hand, customers typically have more 
information on their financial situation than the lenders. As a result, even 
though they are likely to be aware of their potential difficulties to reimburse 
the loan, some borrowers might be prone to provide a biased assessment of 
their own financial situation in order to contract loans.  
The second type of potential market dysfunction can be sparked by 
behavioural biases of consumers. In short, behavioural economics tries to 
show that consumers do not systematically choose their products in their 
best interests, as their behaviour and purchasing strategies are markedly 
influenced by specific contexts and psychological factors. As such, the 
consumer protection approach of consumer loans is partly based on 
microeconomic concepts such as the nature of the consumer’s rationality, the 
different cognitive biases of consumers and the ability of consumers to make 
optimal choices. The application of behavioural economics to questions of 
regulatory reforms and regulatory impact assessment triggers important 
debates about the appropriate consumer protection in relation to consumer 
credits and also questions the relationship between behaviourist research 
and regulation, and how both can interact with each other in an efficient 
manner.11  
In recent years, both types of market dysfunctions have been 
increasingly placed within the scope of regulatory concerns, especially as the 
number of household bankruptcies and the share of non-performing loans 
have been on average higher than before the financial crisis, especially with 
the cases involving revolving loans. Although such trends contain a 
significant ‘macroeconomic component’, as the persistent 
recession/stagnation of most European economies has boosted 
unemployment rates and potential over-indebtedness, the increasing 
financial difficulties of these households have raised new concerns about 
consumer rights. National and European regulators have attempted to 
further enforce and/or even to amend the existing legislative framework in 
order to reinforce consumer protection through three main channels.  
                                                   
11 Consumer loans have attracted a great deal of attention from behavioural 
economists, since the flexibility of these financial products (from small to large 
amounts, many types of repayment strategies, with or without collaterals, etc.) 
makes them available to a wide range of households, including those with rather 
low income, poor collateral and poor education. 
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Firstly, regulators have highlighted the need for ethical behaviour 
across the retail financial industry. The driving force behind this regulatory 
strategy can be summarised in the motto “Provide customers with financial 
services they need and can afford”. Overall, some elements of this approach 
are rather vague, as the necessary innovation process occurring in the 
financial industry leads to constant redefinitions of the concept of ‘needs’; 
however, the ‘can afford’ principle is likely to offer a sounder base for further 
recommendations, notably by enhancing the responsible lending approach 
of financial institutions (FIs).12 Responsible lending policies – typically 
requiring lenders to offer credit only if the borrower must be reasonably 
expected to repay the loan without substantial hardship – place greater 
responsibility on the lender to ensure that lending is consistent with the 
interests of the borrower. 
The second strategy focuses on the type of information FIs are required 
to disclose. Here, the main challenge has been to find an appropriate balance 
between the quantity and the quality of the information, to achieve what 
some regulators call ‘smart disclosure’. The behaviourist research placing the 
emphasis on the different cognitive biases affecting the decision-making 
process of consumers can help design more efficient regulations in that 
respect and favour better targeted information. In general, disclosure policy 
remains at the base of consumer policy, as it is less controversial and 
complicated to implement than some other policies aimed at improving 
customer outcomes (such as suitability requirements or restrictions on 
certain product features). Disclosure is indeed based on the principle of 
‘buyer beware’, which assumes that if information is transparent and readily 
accessible, the burden of choice and subsequent outcomes should fall 
predominantly on the customer.  
Finally, the third channel has enhanced the responsibility of 
consumers, whose choices can be more rational with appropriate financial 
education. However, some critics still doubt the effectiveness of financial 
education policies, highlighting the poor performance of this policy once it 
is evaluated through the cost-benefit analysis framework.13  
Overall, the regulators following the growth approach of consumer 
credit (central banks, domestic ministers of economic affairs, etc.) have few 
or no links with regulators focusing on the consumer protection dimension 
of consumer loans (domestic ministers of social affairs, justice, etc.). This is 
                                                   
12 The scope covered by financial institutions (FIs) is provided in the Appendix 1. 
13 For example, see Bianchi et al. (2013). 
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especially the case for European regulators where, for instance, the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs generally highlights 
the need to “unlock credit in support of recovery” (see the Editorial of the 
European Economic Forecast published in February 2014),14 while the 
Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers tends to emphasise the 
harmful effects of financial products such as consumer loans on a certain 
category of households.15  
This state of affairs can lead to misunderstanding by both FIs and 
consumers, and contradictory policies. In recent years, both domestic and 
European regulators focusing on growth aspects have continuously 
promoted retail loans, including consumer credit, and highlighted the 
economic risk of having too many financially constrained households, 
thereby sometimes downplaying the harmful effects of over-indebtedness. 
On the other hand, the policy-makers adopting the protection approach have 
mostly emphasised the difficulties of some households, especially those with 
poor incomes and collateral, perhaps sometimes to the detriment of 
households with rather healthy balance sheets.  
Therefore, one of the main objectives of the first part of the report will 
be to find an appropriate balance between the revival of consumer credit, 
which is necessary to support real economic growth, and efficient and 
perhaps targeted consumer protection. In other words, the aim is to define 
an equilibrium where both lenders and borrowers can find satisfaction. 
As such, the Task Force will first provide some original tools to foster 
the positive impact of consumer credit on economic growth. At a 
microeconomic level, the different issues and possible frameworks regarding 
efficient consumer protection will be revisited and some original answers 
will be provided. Finally, we will propose some new perspectives and 
philosophies to design recommendations which can combine both economic 
growth and consumer protection considerations. 
Integration, consumer protection and growth 
In the second part of the Task Force, the analysis will try to determine the 
available options for reaching an appropriate balance between dynamic 
integrated credit markets and efficient consumer protection. 
                                                   
14 See European Commission (2014a). 
15 See for example the “Study on the functioning of the consumer credit market in 
Europe” (2013, p. 193). 
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Firstly, some questions will be raised regarding the added value that 
further integration of the household credit might achieve for both lenders 
and borrowers. In the context of the implementation of the banking union, 
the ECB highlights the need to reduce the integration gap between retail and 
interbank markets in order to alleviate systemic risks in the banking sector. 
The explicit objectives behind the setup of the banking union are primarily 
to reinforce financial stability and to sever the sovereign-bank links, while 
little or nothing is said about credit growth and consumer protection. Within 
the current debate about the banking union, very few analyses have indeed 
attempted to demonstrate in detail the real impact of further financial 
integration on credit growth and consumer protection.16 
Therefore, one of the goals of the Task Force will be to try to analyse 
the feasibility and the effects of further integration of household credit by 
adopting FIs and consumers perspectives. In other words, what type of 
integration can better serve credit growth and consumer rights and to what 
extent can it so? 
Digital banking and new business models 
Secondly, the Task Force will analyse the prospects offered by the digital 
evolution and will assess how EU regulation on digital matters could serve 
both lenders and borrowers. In particular, the Task Force will emphasise the 
need for simplification and flexibility of the electronic signature: indeed, 
such an improvement could contribute noticeably to the growth of distance 
credit and, in the meantime, reinforce consumer protection.  
Lastly, the Task Force will determine in what sense and to what extent 
the introduction of new technologies, products and entrants to consumer 
credit markets can affect both the supply of consumer credit and consumer 
protection. In this respect, a particular focus will be made on the possibilities 
in terms of growth and customer relationships offered by peer-to-peer 
lending and crowdfunding. The Task Force will also assess what risks can 
emerge from the developments of these new business models, products and 
technologies and the different available options for policy design. 
 
                                                   
16 For example, the potential negative effects of the banking structural reform (which 
will grant the single supervisor the power to separate retail activities from trading 
activities) for the stability and economic efficiency of household retail activities do 
not seem to be appropriately assessed in the impact study of the COM proposal 
published in January 2014. 
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CHAPTER 2. SCOPE AND MARKET 
ASSESSMENT 
n section 2.1, definitions of consumer credit will be provided according 
to two different approaches: the statistical approach and the legal 
approach. Section 2.2 will present the main types of consumer loans. 
Some specific types of financial products, which can challenge the definitions 
of consumer credit, will be analysed in more detail. In addition, the main 
elements defining the scope of the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) will be 
presented, as well as some policy implications resulting notably from the 
differences between the legal and statistical approaches. Finally, in section 
2.3, a market assessment will be provided for both the overall consumer loan 
markets and the different groups of products. 
2.1 Statistical and legal definition 
Two approaches can be adopted to define a scope for consumer credit: the 
statistical approach and the legal approach. Within the statistical approach, a 
very general definition, published by the ECB in its statistical glossary, is as 
follows: ‘loans granted to households for personal use in the consumption of 
goods and services. Credit granted to the sole proprietors and 
unincorporated partnerships is comprised in this category if the reporting FI 
knows that the loan is predominantly used for personal purposes’. In the 
database of the Bank of England, consumer loans are defined as follows: ‘a 
loan that established consumer credit that is granted for personal use; 
usually unsecured and based on the borrower’s integrity and ability to pay’. 
At the EU level, the legal approach is intimately linked with the 2008 
Consumer Credit Directive. This key piece of European legislation provides 
extensive definitions of consumer credit. As such, it defines key related 
concepts as follows: 
- “consumer” means a natural person who, in transactions covered by this 
Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or 
profession; 
- “creditor” means a natural or legal person who grants or promises to grant 
credit in the course of his trade, business or profession;  
- “credit agreement” means an agreement whereby a creditor grants or 
promises to grant to a consumer credit in the form of a deferred payment, loan 
I
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or other similar financial accommodation, except for agreements for the 
provision on a continuing basis of services or for the supply of goods of the 
same kind, where the consumer pays for such services or goods for the duration 
of their provision by means of instalments. 
2.2 Different types of consumer credit 
Typology 
Partly in line with the Study on the functioning of the consumer credit 
market in Europe, published in July 2013 for the European Commission, this 
report considers seven categories of consumer credit: 
1. Overdrafts 
2. Open-ended credit or revolving loan 
3. Unsecured credit not linked to purchase of a good or service and with contractually 
determined credit amount and repayment period 
4. Unsecured credit linked to the acquisition of new good or service 
5. Secured credit linked to the acquisition of a new good where the surety is the good 
bought 
6. Credit not linked to the acquisition of a new good or service and secured by 
movable property owned by the borrower (The security remains with the lender in 
safekeeping) 
7. Leasing 
Typically, an overdraft allows the individual to continue withdrawing 
money even though his account has no more funds. There are two main types 
of overdraft: the authorised overdraft and the unauthorised overdraft (overrunning). 
The former concerns formal contractual arrangement allowing an individual 
to access funds in excess of the balance of a current account held at an FI.17 
The latter is a tacit acceptance of the access by an individual to funds from a 
current account either in excess of the contractual limit set by the FI, i.e. in 
excess of the overdraft facility that was granted, or in case no overdraft 
facility has been granted. The contractual limit is either the account’s balance 
or the maximum amount of the authorised overdraft. 
The open-ended credit or revolving loan is a credit agreement without fixed 
duration. This type includes credits which must be repaid in full within or 
after a period; however, once repaid, this credit becomes available to be 
                                                   
17 Interest is not always charged on the amount which is an overdraft. 
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drawn down again. A revolving loan can be provided through three main 
types of credit instruments: 
- Personal line of credit: Formal contractual arrangement allowing an 
individual to borrow in one or several steps up to the limit specified in 
the contract at a time chosen by the borrower. Once the credit is repaid, 
new credit can be drawn down. Such credit is also called a revolving 
credit. 
- Credit card: This type of card allows the cardholder to decide how 
much to pay of the monthly balance shown on the monthly card 
statement subject to a minimum payment and an overall credit limit. 
Such cards are issued by financial institutions and a variety of retailers. 
In the latter case, the cards are also referred to as store cards. Interest 
is not always charged on the outstanding balance. 
- Charge card: This type of card requires the cardholder to pay the full 
balance shown on the monthly card statement within a specified 
period, typically two to four weeks. Such cards are issued by financial 
institutions and retailers. 
The unsecured credit not linked to purchase of a good or service and 
with contractually determined credit amount and repayment period is 
provided on the basis of a credit agreement in which the total amount of the 
credit is specified and the repayment method (instalments or one-time 
payment at the end of the credit agreement) is specified. The credit is not 
linked explicitly in the credit agreement to the acquisition of a particular 
product or service. 
The unsecured credit linked to the acquisition of new good or service 
is provided on the basis of a credit agreement in which the total amount of 
the credit is specified and the repayment method (instalments or one-time 
payment at the end of the credit agreement) is specified. The credit is linked 
explicitly in the credit agreement to the acquisition of a particular good or 
service. The credit is unsecured. Such credit is also referred to as 
store/credit/mail order instalment credit. Typical examples of this type of 
credit include credit facilities offered by some furniture and electronic 
retailers, some distance-sellers, etc. 
Secured credit linked to the acquisition of a new good where the surety 
is the good bought is provided on the basis of a credit agreement in which 
the total amount of the credit is specified and the repayment method 
(instalments or one-time payment at the end of the credit agreement) is 
specified. The credit is linked explicitly in the credit agreement to the 
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acquisition of a particular good and is secured by the good being bought on 
credit. A typical case concerns a loan for a car. 
Credit not linked to the acquisition of a new good or service and 
secured by movable property owned by the borrower. The security remains 
with the lender in safekeeping. Related products include notably the loans 
extended by the pawnbroker in the UK, the ‘prêteur sur gage’ in France and 
the ‘Pfandleiher’ in Germany. 
Finally, leasing has become a very common financial product across 
the EU-28 and consists of a legal document outlining the terms under which 
one party agrees to rent an asset from another party. A lease guarantees the 
lessee (the renter) use of an asset and guarantees the lessor (the property 
owner) regular payments from the lessee for a specified period of time. Both 
the lessee and the lessor must uphold the terms of the contract for the lease 
to remain valid. At the end of the contract, the lessee has generally the 
possibility to acquire the rented asset versus a payment usually equivalent 
to the estimated residual value of the asset.   
Some ambiguities on some loans to household and non-profit institutions 
serving households (NPISHs) 
Some ambiguities can be raised regarding the classification of some financial 
products as ‘consumer loans’. In the statistics defined and published by the 
ECB, consumer loans are included within the group ‘lending by FIs to households 
and NPISHs’. There are two other types in this group according to the methodologies 
developed by the ECB: 
- Loans for house purchase: “credit extended to households for the purpose 
of investment in housing, including building and home improvements; the 
following types are included: loans secured by residential property 
(i.e. mortgage loans) that are used for house purchase and, where 
identifiable, other loans for house purchase provided on a personal 
basis or secured by other types of asset”. 
- Other loans: “this includes loans granted to households for purposes other 
than consumption and house purchase. This may include professional 
loans, debt consolidation,18 education, etc. The category may also 
                                                   
18 The debt consolidation loans correspond to the combining of several unsecured 
debts into a single, new loan that is typically more favourable. As such, debt 
consolidation involved taking out a new loan to pay off a number of other debts. The 
new loan may result in a lower interest rate, lower monthly payment or both. 
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include loans for consumption purposes to sole proprietors and 
unincorporated partnerships if these are not reported under the 
category ‘credit for consumption’”.  
Although the three statistical categories of lending by FIs to 
households and NPISHs are commonly used in the EU-28, the lines between 
them can sometimes be unclear. For example, in some countries, some loans 
granted for the purpose of extending an already acquired house or 
significantly improving this house are classified as consumer loans, while 
definitions of the ECB classify them as loans for house purchase. As such, 
several national banking associations in the EU-28 provide data on total 
gross and outstanding residential loans, with a distinction between the 
purchase of a house and the improvement of an already acquired house.  
The line between ‘consumer loans’ and ‘other loans’ can also be 
challenged for some financial products.19 The statistical distinction is indeed 
not always respected at national level. For example, in the case of overdraft 
(which is in principle classified as a consumer loan), it appears that some 
central banks classify such credit under ‘other lending’, often because they 
have no information on the purpose of the overdraft, i.e. for consumer 
purposes or for business purposes, when the account holder is an individual 
who is also self-employed (European Commission, 2013).  
For some other financial products, the statistical and the legal approach 
can have opposite views regarding their classification as ‘consumer loan’ or ‘other 
loans’. This is notably the case for leasing. Depending on some of its features, 
statistical and legal approaches at European level can use different 
methodologies for classification. Both the ECB and the EC and its CCD do 
not include “leasing and hire purchase with possibility but no obligation to 
buy at the end of the contract” in their scope for consumer loans. This is 
confirmed in the scope defined by the CCD, Article 2, d (see row 12 in Table 
2.1, which reveals the difficulties of setting a clear scope for the CCD) and by 
the detailed ECB glossary of statistical terms. However, both approaches 
have divergent views when the contract between the lessee and the lessor 
stipulated that the former has the obligation to buy the asset at the end of the 
contract. In that case, the CCD includes leasing as a consumer loan, while the 
statistical classification of the ECB still excludes it.  
                                                   
Consumers, e.g. can use debt consolidation as a tool to make it easier to get out of 
student loan debt, credit card debt and other types of debt that are not tied to an 
asset. 
19 Overall, the category “other lending” has relatively poor consistency across the 
EU-28. 
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Finally, for types of credit within the scope of both the CCD and the 
ECB data, the volume of credit in the ECB data will be larger than the one subject 
to the CCD because all consumer credit agreements below €200 and above €75,000 
are outside the scope of the CCD (European Commission, 2013). 
Table 2.1 Difficulties of setting a clear scope for the CCD 
Type of credit All credit 
agreements 
are sui 
generis 
outside the 
scope of the 
CCD  
Certain credit agreements may be 
outside the scope of the CCD 
because of various exclusion 
factors foreseen by the CCD. 
These cases are detailed below  
Likelihood 
that the credit 
agreement is 
outside the 
scope of the 
CCD*  
1. Authorised 
overdraft 
 If the overdraft has to be repaid 
within one month, but Art. 6(5) of 
the CCD imposes the obligation to 
provide certain information, 
including the APR (if the overdraft 
has to be repaid on demand or 
within three months, only certain 
articles of the CCD apply and 
member states may decide that the 
APR does not need to be provided. 
the total cost of the credit must 
appear in the overdraft agreement) 
Undetermined 
2. Unauthorised 
overdraft 
(overrunning) – 
only Articles 1 to 
3, 18, 20 and 22 to 
32 of CCD apply 
  Low 
3. Personal line of 
credit 
 If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free of interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are repayable 
or credit is for less than €200 
Low 
4. Credit card  If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free of interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable or 
credit limit is below €200 
Low 
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5. Charge card  If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free of interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable or 
credit limit is below €200 
Low 
6. Personal loan 
by traditional 
lenders 
 If credit is for less than €200 Low 
7. High interest 
loans by 
specialised 
lenders (for 
example, doorstep 
loans or home 
collected credit)  
 If credit is for less than €200 Medium 
8. High interest, 
short-term loans 
provided by 
specialised 
lenders and 
typically repaid 
on pay day (e.g. 
payday loans) 
 If credit is for less than €200 High 
9. Unsecured 
credit linked to 
the acquisition of 
new good or 
service 
 If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free if interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable or 
maximum credit is below €200 
Low 
10. Secured credit 
linked to the 
acquisition of a 
new good where 
the surety is the 
good bought 
 If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free of interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable or 
maximum credit is below €200 
Low 
11. Credit secured 
by movable 
property owned 
by the borrower 
and the security is 
kept in the 
safekeeping of the 
lender  
Outside the 
scope of the 
CCD 
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12. Leasing and 
hire purchase 
with obligation to 
buy at the end of 
the contract 
 If credit is free of interest and 
without any charges or if credit is 
free of interest, has to be repaid 
within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable or 
maximum credit is below €20 
Low 
13. Leasing and 
hire purchase 
with possibility 
but no obligation 
to buy at the end 
of the contract 
Outside the 
scope of the 
CCD 
  
14. Special loans 
granted to a 
restricted public 
under a statutory 
provision with a 
general interest 
purpose and at a 
lower interest rate 
than those 
prevailing on the 
market 
Outside the 
scope of the 
CCD 
  
 * Judgment of a likelihood that a credit agreement is outside of the scope of the CCD. 
Source: Ipsos and London Economics (2013). 
Scope of the European regulation 
In the Article 2 of the CCD, the scope of products to which the Directive shall 
apply integrate different key criteria. Firstly, as mentioned above, only credit 
agreements involving a total amount of credit between €200 and €75,000 are 
considered within its scope. Secondly, the CCD clearly excludes all credit 
agreements whose purpose is to retain rights in land or in an existing or 
projected building. Thirdly, overdraft facilities are included provided that 
the credit does not have to be repaid within one month. However, some 
ambiguities remain regarding authorised overdraft that has to be repaid 
within one month (see Table 2.1). In addition, some articles might apply to 
unauthorised overdraft. Fourthly, credit agreements related to personal line 
of credit, credit card, charge card, unsecured credit linked to the acquisition 
of new good and service, secured credit linked to the acquisition of a new 
good where the surety is the good bought and leasing and hire purchase with 
obligations to buy at the end of the contract are excluded from the scope in 
case: 
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- the credit is free of interest and without any charges, 
- the credit is free of interest, has to be repaid within three months and 
only insignificant charges are repayable or 
- the maximum credit is below €200.    
Fifthly, high interest loans by specialised lenders (for example, 
doorstep loans or home collected credit) and high interest, short-term loans 
provided by specialised lenders, and typically repaid on pay day (for 
example, payday loans) are quite likely to be excluded from the scope and to 
be regulated at national level.  
Table 2.1 reveals the overall difficulty of harmonising the scope of the 
CCD across the different member states. The different domestic typologies 
and regulations make it therefore very difficult for the CCD to ensure perfect 
consistency across countries. 
Policy implications 
The scope defined by the CCD is relatively ambitious and includes diverse 
products in terms of risks and dynamics. This high heterogeneity could 
partly explain the difficulties of adopting the text in the first place and of 
implementing it at country level, especially regarding information disclosure 
requirements. Several voices during the Task Force criticised such a wide 
scope, as loans of €200 may require different rules than loans of €75,000. The 
key argument highlighting the risk and costs resulting from the application 
of broadly identical regulation to the whole segment of household retail 
financial products, including mortgage loans and other loans, could also be 
validated for the already much diversified consumer credit segment. 
Nevertheless, once placed within the cost-benefit framework, 
regulations based on a case-by-case approach typically trigger very high 
costs (for both policy design and implementation), which will most likely 
more than overcome the expected benefits. Inversely, the application of 
similar regulations to a wide spectrum of financial products should lower 
costs, but benefits might also be poor and some rules counterproductive for 
numerous products. As a result, one of the tasks of any policy aimed at 
regulating activities in household retail finance is to define in advance the 
optimal benefit to the cost ratio of a regulation, corresponding to a specific 
segmentation of the regulated products.  
Regarding the definition of perimeters, the differentiation between the 
legal and the statistical approaches in the determination of the scope of consumer 
loans could alter somewhat the feasibility of rigorous impact assessments at the 
European level. Indeed, due to this differentiation, it is likely that it is 
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impossible to have a precise statistical representation of the scope of 
products covered, for example, by the CCD in the whole EU-28. The 
effectiveness of impact assessment at the design and/or implementation 
stage can therefore be negatively affected.  
Recommendations 2.2 
 2.2.1 Define an optimal benefit to cost ratio of a regulation, 
corresponding to a specific segmentation of the regulated products. 
 2.2.2 Promote the harmonisation of the legal and statistical 
approaches in the determination of a scope for consumer credit, in 
order to have consistent data which can adequately reflect the scope 
of products of the CCD. 
2.3 Market assessments 
Overall picture in 2013 
In 2013, Germany and the UK were the two largest domestic markets in the 
EU-27, combining around €366.5 billion of assets, namely almost 40% of the 
total outstanding amount of consumer loans in the EU-27 (see Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Domestic market share of consumer loans (in % of EU-27 total, in €, 
current prices, 2013) 
 
Note: NMS12 = New member states joining the EU in 2004 (10) and 2007(2). BX=Benelux. 
Source: CEPS-ECRI statistical database. 
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The French market ranked third, with a market share of 15.6% and €145 
billion of loans under custody, while the Italian market held 11.4% of the EU-
27 total. Notably, the markert share of the NMS-12 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia) stood at 8.5% in 2013. 
In relative terms, the oustanding amount of consumer credit to household 
disposable income ratio (CCDI)20 differed markedly across the EU-27 (see Figure 
2.2). In 2013, the contributing countries could be roughly divided into three 
groups: one with ratios above 15%; a second with medium values (between 
10% and 15%); and a third with low ratios (below 10%). Overall, contrary to 
mortgage loans, where mortgage loans to household disposable income 
ratios depend somewhat on different geographical areas,21 there did not 
seem to be any specific geographical distribution in consumer loans to 
disposable income ratios in the EU-27. For example, ratios varied markedly 
between Central and Eastern European economies: on one hand, Hungary 
was included in the group with high ratios (19.2%) and Romania and Poland 
registered medium values (14.9% and 13.6%, respectively); on the other 
hand, values observed in Estonia (5.8%), Latvia (3.6%) and Slovakia (8.5%) 
were very low. Regarding the largest domestic markets, the UK scored pretty 
high (14.6%), whereas France and Germany recorded significantly lower 
values (10.4% and 9.5%, respectively). 
                                                   
20 Disposable income is the amount of available income after all the transfers (taxes 
and subsidies) have been made.  
21 The outstanding residential debt to disposable income ratio is high in most 
Northern European economies, such as those of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK; medium in most Central and Southern European economies 
(France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, etc.) and low in most Central and Eastern 
European economies (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, etc.). 
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Figure 2.2 Consumer credit as % of disposable income, 2013 
 
Note: Red lines show thresholds of 5%, 10% and 15%. 
Source: CEPS-ECRI statistical database. 
Overall trends 
At end-2013, the total amount of outstanding credit for consumption in the 
EU-2722 contracted by -4.5% year-on-year (vs. -3.7% in December 2012) and -
0.7% quarter-on-quarter (vs. +0.1% in the previous quarter). This poor year-
on-year performance is mainly explained by the aggregate year-on-year contribution 
of the three main domestic markets (France, Germany and the UK), which was 
significantly negative in December 2013 (-2.7% vs. -1.7% one year earlier). 
On the other hand, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden contributed 
positively to the aggregate figure. 
The amount registered at end-2013 for the EU-27 reached 86.8% of its 
level in December 2007.23 However, this aggregate figure masked diverse 
growth dynamics in consumer credit at country level. Some countries 
                                                   
22 The sample includes countries for which data on consumer credit are available 
between January 2003 and December 2013: the EU-15 countries, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary, i.e. 92.8% of the total EU27 figure in December 2013. 
23 December 2007 was chosen as the base month for three reasons. Firstly, it provides 
some of the last data before the start of the financial crisis in the second half of 2008. 
Secondly, in December 2007, the proxy used for the EU-27 was close to its historical 
high recorded in September 2008 (€864.1 billion vs. €873.5 billion). Finally, the choice 
of December for both 2007 and 2013 allows for better control of seasonal effects.  
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experienced robust growth over the period 2007-13. Out of the seven 
countries which recorded cumulative growth above 20% between 2007 and 
2013, five were among the NMS-12 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Malta, Poland 
and Slovakia).  
Within a context of households’ deleveraging, some other domestic 
markets observed a marked contraction over the same period: total 
consumer credit declined by a cumulative -34.3% in the UK, -37.6% in 
Lithuania, -38.5% in Ireland and -40.3% in Spain. Nevertheless, once adjusted 
for exchange rate movements, the contraction recorded for the UK stood at -
25.3%.  
Considering pre-crisis dynamics, it is worth noting that between 
January 2003 and December 2007, credit for consumption was on a robust 
upward trend in the EU-27, mirroring upward trajectories in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and all the EU-15 member states, excluding Germany 
(see Table 2.2). Between December 2007 and December 2013, these trends 
either reversed or eased noticeably for all the countries of the sample, except 
Luxembourg and Sweden.  
Table 2.2 Slope of the linear trends (average of 2007 = 100) 
 Jan 
2003-
Dec 
2007 
Dec 
2007-
Dec 
2013 
 Jan 
2003-
Dec 
2007 
Dec 
2007-
Dec 
2013 
 Jan 
2003-
Dec 
2007 
Dec 
2007-
Dec 
2013 
Austria 0.48 -0.25 Germany -0.25 0.10 NL 0.44 0.14 
Belgium 0.15 -0.17 Greece 1.26 0.09 Portugal 0.63 -0.30 
Czech Rep. 1.41 0.62 Hungary 1.62 0.02 Spain 0.96 -0.76 
Denmark 0.60 -0.50 Ireland 0.93 -0.96 Sweden 0.65 0.81 
Finland 0.78 0.21 Italy 0.85 0.20 UK 0.33 -0.39 
France 0.38 -0.03 Lux. 0.21 0.74 EU27* 0.42 -0.17 
Note: Figures are calculated based on values expressed in euro.  
* Proxy for the EU-27. 
Source: Own calculations based on European Central Bank data. 
Drivers behind overall trends 
Different macroeconomic factors could explain the evolution of consumer 
credit since 2007 in the euro area. The amount of credit for consumption is 
the result of a confrontation between the demand for consumer loans and 
the availability of this financial product. Regarding the former, gross 
disposable income of households is likely to be one of the main drivers, while 
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the level of interest rates on new consumer loans typically reflects the 
availability of consumer credit to households.  
Last but not least, housing prices can affect consumer credit through 
the demand and the availability of loans, since both borrowers and lenders 
will consider housing prices when getting involved in a consumer loan. As 
housing is a major component of households’ wealth, rising house prices 
may stimulate consumption by increasing households’ perceived wealth, or 
by relaxing borrowing constraints.24  
Based on simple correlations, gross disposable income of households 
(correlation of 35%) and nominal house prices (24%) are likely to have played 
a significant role in the euro area between 2007 and 2013. However, interest 
rates on new loans appeared to have had little impact (-4%). 
Finally, some specific domestic and European rules may have 
influenced somewhat the dynamics of consumer credit markets over the last 
decade. An empirical study aimed at measuring the precise impact of the 
regulatory framework on consumer credit would be very useful to 
understand what has been at stake with the different related regulations. 
Nevertheless, although useful, such a study is generally very difficult to 
conduct, especially as the scale of a regulation can hardly be translated into 
figures. Some strong restrictive assumptions will therefore be necessary and 
are likely to weaken the interest of such impact studies. 
Trends by type of products 
The breakdown of consumer credit by type of products is accessible for a 
certain number of national central banks. Very little data on a breakdown is 
accessible at the ECB level for outstanding amounts. In its yearly Statistical 
Package on household finance, ECRI presents the breakdown for some 
countries, based on domestic methodologies (see Table 2.3). However, no 
consistency exists at EU level on this breakdown, partly mirroring different 
market practices and social norms, as well as differentiated institutional 
background and processes in the collection of data.  
                                                   
24 In addition, against the backdrop of rising housing prices, households are more 
likely to purchase a dwelling, resulting in higher demand for consumer loans to fund 
new appliances, furniture, etc.   
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Table 2.3 Poor statistical consistency across countries for the different types of 
consumer loans (outstanding loans, % of the total) 
 
Note: Data in bold correspond to the outstanding value of consumer loans, in euro at current 
prices. 
Sources: CEPS and ECRI. 
The data provided in Table 2.3 reveal highly diverse breakdowns 
between EU-28 member states. To a certain extent, such diversity is likely to 
obstruct the conduct of consistent impact assessment by product groups 
across the EU-27. For example, the analysis of the impact of the CCD on the 
activities of personal loans could be developed only for a certain number of 
countries, notably Hungary, Greece and France. Therefore, high 
differentiation in the collection, classification by sub-groups and publication 
of data most likely does not facilitate the design, calibration and 
implementation process of policies at European level.  
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Nevertheless, in short, existing data can reveal several significant 
trends at domestic level. Firstly, the market share of personal loans has 
increased markedly in France, notably resulting from the negative effect of 
the ‘Lagarde law’ (2010) on the activities of revolving loans and has remained 
very high in Greece. Secondly, the market share of credit card loans has 
gradually increased in the UK, amounting to roughly 36% of total consumer 
loans in 2013. Opposite trends can be observed in Greece, where this type of 
loan has lost broadly one-third of its pre-crisis market share. Thirdly, the 
distribution of activity volumes across product categories has remained 
relatively stable in Belgium and Poland.  
Recommendations 2.3 
 2.3.1 Promote the analysis of macroeconomic drivers behind the 
dynamics and trends in consumer loan markets. 
 2.3.2 Promote the harmonisation of statistical breakdowns of 
consumer loans by products across the EU-28 + EEA. 
 2.3.3 Enhance the development of strong methodologies to conduct 
appropriate impact studies of specific regulations on the dynamism 
of household credit markets. 
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CHAPTER 3. GROWTH APPROACH 
he growth approach of consumer credit is twofold: on one hand, 
policy-makers emphasise the amount of growth (quantitative approach); 
on the other hand, some policies are designed to enhance its content 
(qualitative approach). 
The quantitative approach is based on national accounts methodologies 
and, in recent years, has often advocated that regulators have to “unlock 
credit in support of recovery” (see the Editorial of the European Economic 
Forecast published in February 2014).25 Within this approach, regulators 
typically adopt the expenditure approach of GDP by emphasising the 
interactions between consumer credit and aggregate private consumption of 
households. The objective is therefore to promote consumer credit as a tool 
to encourage private consumption. Different policy-makers are involved in 
that process.  
First, by lowering their policy rates, central banks typically try to ease 
lending standards and encourage consumer credit in order to give a boost to 
household consumption. This policy aims to influence consumer credit 
directly and targets an indirect positive impact on private consumption. 
Secondly, tax policies aim at influencing private consumption essentially by 
cutting or hiking indirect taxes on consumer loans. The effectiveness of 
decreasing indirect taxes would partly depend on the ability of some 
consumers to contract loans to acquire specific goods, such as eco-friendly 
cars or windows. The quality of the framework ruling consumer loans is 
therefore vital. This brings us to the third type of policy-maker, who are 
directly involved into the design of the regulations and rules of consumer 
credit markets. During the regulatory design process, these regulators 
should keep in mind that these rules should help find an appropriate balance 
between financial stability, consumer protection and growth. 
The second growth approach places the focus on the qualitative side of 
economic growth (qualitative approach) and might fall notably within the 
scope of the Europe 2020 strategy and its targets in terms of low-carbon 
economy. Given that few policy initiatives have been taken to use consumer 
credit as a tool to achieve sustainable growth in an efficient and balanced 
manner, this report offers some recommendations in that direction. The 
qualitative approach is closely linked with the concept of sustainable growth. 
                                                   
25 See European Commission (2014a).  
T
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3.1 Quantitative approach 
Subdued private consumption of households 
At a macroeconomic level, although few studies have demonstrated it, 
consumer credit is generally considered to have a noticeable impact on private 
consumption of households, which remains from far the main contributor to real 
GDP in the EU-28 (between 2000 and 2013, on average, private consumption 
of households contributed to 57.8% of the real GDP in the EU-28). However, 
the contribution of private consumption to real GDP growth since the 
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008-09 has been very poor, resulting in 
very low macroeconomic performance.  
Between 2010 and 2013, the average annual real GDP growth reached 
+0.4% in the EU-28 (down from +2.8% in the pre-crisis period 2004-07); on 
the other hand, it stood at +2.0% in the US (vs. +2.6% in 2004-07). This 
significant transatlantic output gap in 2010-13 was primarily the result of 
differentiated contributions from private consumption of households: -0.1 
percentage point (pp) in the EU-28 (vs. +1.3 pp in 2004-07) and +1.5 pp in the 
US (vs. +2.0 pp in 2004-07). Considering long-term developments, the average 
growth recorded in 2010-13 in the EU-28 was much below its long-term average: 
indeed, between 1996 and 2007, the average contribution of real private 
consumption to GDP stood at +1.4 pp (vs. 2.4 pp in the US). 
Table 3.1 Developments in consumer loan markets and key macroeconomic 
variables 
 EU-28 US 
Period 1996-07  2004-07 2010-13 1996-07 2004-07 2010-13 
Outstanding consumer 
loans (yearly average 
real growth) 
+7.9% +4.8% -6.2% +4.2% +2.2% +4.0% 
Real private 
consumption (yearly 
average contribution to 
real GDP growth) 
+1.4 pp. +1.3 pp. -0.1 pp. 2.4 pp. +2.0 pp. +1.5 pp. 
Real GDP (average 
yearly growth) 
+2.6% +2.8% +0.4%  +3.2% +2.6% +2.0% 
Source: ECRI Statistical Package 2014 and Eurostat. 
The poor macroeconomic performance in the EU-28 raises the question on the 
relation between potential and effective growth in private consumption of 
households. One possible approach is to analyse the fluctuations in the ratio 
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of private consumption to household disposable (PCDI). Steady ratio values 
imply stable saving rates (saving to disposable income ratio) and a growth 
in private consumption similar to disposable income. However, rising values 
of the PCDI mirror growth in private consumption above its potential (and 
vice versa).  
In comparison with 2004-07, the average PCDI recorded over the 
period 2010-13 contracted in most EU-15 economies, notably in Sweden (-5.6 
pp), Denmark (-4.6 pp); the UK (-3.9 pp), Ireland26 (-3.7 pp), Portugal (-2.8 
pp), Finland (-1.6 pp), Spain (-1.5 pp), the Netherlands (-0.7 pp) and France 
(-0.5 pp). Compared to long-term average (1995-2007), the average PCDI also 
decreased in the majority of EU-15 countries for which data are available, albeit 
generally at a slower pace: -5.6 pp in Sweden, -2.7 pp in Denmark, -1.4 pp in 
Portugal, -1.3 pp in Finland, -1.1 pp in Spain, -0.9 pp in the UK and -0.5 pp 
in France.  
These numerous contractions reveal the poor performance of 
household private consumption since 2010 and partly result from the need 
of households to rebuild their balance sheets, especially by boosting their 
savings in the aftermath of the financial crisis (as a response to the ensuing 
heightened economic uncertainties). As such, households have gradually 
substituted debts for savings, resulting in a significant decrease in consumer 
credits in recent years. Between 2010 and 2013, the real outstanding amount of 
consumer loans recorded a cumulative contraction of -17.6% in the EU-28 (while, 
it increased by +12.4% in the US). Considering annual data over the period 
2003-13, the nominal stocks of consumer loans and private consumption of 
households (both time series in variations) are highly and positively 
correlated in the EU-28 (more than 50%; see Figure 3.1).27 Since 2010, this 
correlation has been much higher.  
The very high positive correlation since 2010 between outstanding 
consumer loans and private consumption has resulted from some 
combination of two effects: on one hand, as analysed above, deleveraging 
needs of households due to the rising uncertainties and economic difficulties 
prompted many households to substitute debts and consumption for 
                                                   
26 For Ireland, the analysed period is 2010-12 instead of 2010-13.  
27 New loans would be more appropriate there than outstanding; however, it is 
rather difficult to have consistent data on new loans across countries. Nevertheless, 
outstanding data can also be a good proxy for the activity of consumer loan markets 
since it also includes new loans and is therefore directly affected by the fluctuations 
in new businesses. 
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savings. As such, the lower preference for current consumption has led to 
decreasing demand for consumer credits. On the other hand, the internal 
difficulties of consumer credit markets, owing notably to growing regulation 
and damaged reputation of consumer credit products, put a noticeable drag 
on consumption possibilities of households, resulting in poor 
macroeconomic performance. The present analysis proposes to focus on the 
second interpretation, as it could help understand how to boost the efficiency 
of the consumer credit market and economic growth. 
Figure 3.1 Real private consumption; outstanding amounts of consumer credit and 
lending standards (variation in % for real private consumption and outstanding 
amounts and annual value of the diffusion index for the lending standards)  
 
Note: Data on lending standards are based on the methodology of the diffusion index. The 
‘diffusion index’ is the weighted difference between the share of FIs reporting that credit 
standards have been tightened and the share of FIs reporting that they have been eased. The 
diffusion index is constructed in the following way: lenders who have answered 
“considerably” are given a weight twice as high (score of 1) as lenders having answered 
“somewhat” (score of 0.5). Positive values imply a tightening in lending standards. 
Sources: ECRI Statistical Package and European Central Bank (Bank Lending Survey). 
Credit supply  
The equilibrium of the consumer credit market results from the 
confrontation of the supply of consumer loans with the demand for these 
loans. Supply can be approached in different ways; however, one common 
approach is to analyse the lending standards as they are perceived by FIs 
across the euro area. The Bank Lending Survey (BLS) published on a 
quarterly basis by the ECB is a significant help in this respect since it is based 
on consistent methodologies over time and across countries and integrates a 
wide pool of FIs, covering most of the euro-area market. However, one of the 
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main limits of this approach is that it is survey-based and mainly depends 
on the perception of FIs. 
Regarding overall lending standards on the consumer credit markets, 
the diffusion index published by the ECB for consumer loans in the euro area 
displays a high negative correlation with private consumption (-60%), which 
could show the importance of lending standards for dynamic private 
consumption (see Figure 3.1). This observation leads to analysing the drivers 
behind lending standards assessed in the BLS. As shown by Table 3.2, mainly 
economic phenomena, such as the risk on the collateral demanded and 
expectations regarding general economic activity, have substantially 
contributed to tightening lending standards since the outset of the financial 
crisis.  
Table 3.2 Lending standards and main drivers (cumulative value of the diffusion 
index) 
Factors Cumulative impact Correlation with 
lending standards 
(Q1 2003-Q3 2014 
 Q1 2008-
Q3 2014 
Q1 2010-
Q3 2014 
 
Bank competition -19.7 -18.7 0.54 
Cost of funds and balance sheet 
constraints 
103.3 49.0 0.75 
Creditworthiness of consumers 200.1 78.8 0.90 
Expectations regarding general 
economic activity 
184.8 64.7 0.91 
Non-bank competition 2.4 -4.1 0.53 
Risk on the collateral demanded 110.3 35.2 0.87 
Note: Data on lending standards are based on the methodology of the diffusion index. The 
“diffusion index” refers to the weighted difference between the share of FIs reporting an 
increase in loan demand and the share of FIs reporting a decline. The diffusion index is 
constructed in the following way: lenders who have answered “considerably” are given a 
weight twice as high (score of 1) as lenders having answered “somewhat” (score of 0.5). 
Positive values imply an increase in demand. 
Source: European Central Bank (Bank Lending Survey). 
However, other factors partly shaped by the new banking regulation 
have also weighed down lending standards. As such, the “cost of funds and 
balance sheet constraints” (see the definition in Box 1) have been the third 
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contributor to the tightening of lending standards since 2010. The gradual 
implementation of the price-based ratios, e.g. the liquidity ratios (liquidity 
coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio), admittedly have the merit of 
reinforcing financial stability; but they can also weaken the liquidity 
positions of some retail FIs by heightening funds and balance sheet 
constraints. Depending on the intensity of the practised pass-through by FIs, 
the increased cost of funds can result in tightening lending standards.  
Poor demand for consumer credit 
As expected, the correlation between household private consumption and 
the demand for credit loans published in the context of the BLS is positive 
and very high (above 67%). Regarding the macroeconomic backdrop, 
consumer confidence and spending on durable consumer goods are the two 
main negative contributors to the demand for consumer credit (see definition 
of “consumer confidence” in Box 1 below).  
 
Box 1. Glossary of bank lending terms 
Lending standards 
Consumer confidence  
Consumers’ assessments of economic and financial trends in a particular 
country and/or in the euro area. They include assessments of the past and 
current financial situations of households and resulting prospects for the 
future, assessments of the past and current general economic situation and 
resulting prospects for the future, as well as assessments of the advisability of 
making residential investments, particularly in terms of affordability, and/or 
major purchases of durable consumer goods. 
Cost of funds and balance sheet constraints  
A bank’s capital and the costs related to its capital position can become a 
balance sheet constraint that may inhibit the expansion of its lending. For a 
given level of capital, the bank’s loan supply could be affected by its liquidity 
position and its access to money and debt markets. Similarly, a bank could 
abstain from granting a loan, or be less willing to lend, if it knows that it will 
not be able subsequently to transfer the risk (synthetic securitisation) or the 
entire asset (true-sale securitisation) off its balance sheet. 
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Credit standards 
The internal guidelines or criteria that reflect a bank’s lending policy. They 
are the written and unwritten criteria, or other practices related to this policy, 
which define the types of loan a bank considers desirable and undesirable, its 
designated geographical priorities, collateral deemed acceptable or 
unacceptable, etc. For the purposes of the survey, changes in written loan 
policies, together with changes in their application, should be reported. 
Collateral 
The security given by a borrower to a lender as a pledge for the repayment of 
a loan. This could include certain financial securities, such as equity or debt 
securities, real estate or compensating balances (a compensating balance is the 
minimum amount of a loan that the borrower is required to keep in an account 
at the bank). 
Non-FIs 
In general, these consist of non-monetary financial corporations, in particular 
insurance corporations and pension funds, financial auxiliaries and other 
financial intermediaries. 
Source: Bank Lending Survey, European Central Bank, January 2015. 
 
Household savings have also dragged down markedly the demand for 
consumer credit. The lack of consumer confidence reflects the poor economic 
prospects and rising unemployment rates and might have prompted many 
households to accumulate precautionary savings in order to insure against 
the risk of lower future income. Rising household savings despite the 
successive cuts in policy rates of many central banks (which aim at 
promoting consumption and credit over savings) can also result from the 
gradual mistrust in the financial products of consumer credit. Households 
prefer accumulating target savings in order to cope with significant expenditures, 
such as the purchase of durable goods, the payment of tuition fees, vacation 
spending, etc., rather than acquiring the good first through consumer credit and 
accumulating the necessary savings later, under the form of gradual debt repayment. 
Several policies can alter somewhat the dynamics of target savings. 
Admittedly, cultural and social factors can explain much of the target 
saving’s process; however, any policy aimed at reinforcing the quality of the 
contracts of consumer loans, especially in terms of consumer protection, is 
likely to lift the demand for households’ loans and to bring down the 
accumulation of target savings.  
TOWARDS A BALANCED CONTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY | 41 
Table 3.3 Demand and main drivers (cumulative value of the diffusion index) 
Factors Cumulative impact Correlation with 
lending standards 
(Q1 2003-Q3 2014 
 Q1 2008-
Q3 2014 
Q1 2010-
Q3 2014 
 
Consumer confidence -301.9 -138.0 0.81 
Household savings -83.9 -56.6 0.70 
Loans from other banks -40.3 -34.4 0.03 
Other sources of finance -18.6 -11.6 0.57 
Securities purchases -94.8 -23.9 0.40 
Spending on durable consumer goods -227.5 -125.5 0.92 
Note: Data on lending standards are based on the methodology of the diffusion index. The 
“diffusion index” refers to the weighted difference between the share of FIs reporting an 
increase in loan demand and the share of FIs reporting a decline. The diffusion index is 
constructed in the following way: lenders who have answered “considerably” are given a 
weight twice as high (score of 1) as lenders having answered “somewhat” (score of 0.5). 
Positive values imply an increase in demand. 
Source: European Central Bank (Bank Lending Survey). 
Pros and cons of quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach is used extensively by central banks when 
designing their monetary policies. Modern economies are essentially based on 
debt accumulation, as shown by the economic growth dynamics in the two 
decades preceding the financial crisis of 2008-09. As a result, the easy 
monetary policies currently conducted by many central banks in the EU-28, 
including the ECB,28 should help to avoid possible long-term economic 
depressions, as experienced by the Japanese economy from the mid-1990s to 
the second half of the 2000.  
However, according notably to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS) (2014), ultra-easy monetary policies are likely to build up stocks of debt above 
optima, resulting in rising financial fragility. Typically, the costs of easy 
monetary policies will become apparent only over time and with hindsight, 
                                                   
28 In a context of persistent poor economic performance and the fading out of HICP 
inflation, the ECB lowered its key interest rate six times between November 2011 
and June 2014, by a total of 135 bps. These successive cuts are a strong signal that the 
ECB’s intention since 2011 has been to enhance lending to the real economy and to 
promote consumption and investment over savings. 
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as has happened often enough in the past. Indeed, the financial instability 
resulting from the increasing stock of debt in the long run remains 
undetected by policy-makers since they are essentially focused on short-term 
business cycle dynamics, thereby missing the debt dynamics. The implied 
question in the present report is to assess if the potential build-up of 
consumer credit in the coming years in order to boost private consumption 
can significantly contribute to financial instability. One related question is to 
assess whether consumer credit markets are systematically important for the 
financial sector.  
Considering the criterion of the stock of debt to evaluate the systematic 
importance of a financial activity, consumer credit pales in comparison with 
housing debt, non-financial corporation debt and sovereign debt (in the euro 
area 12, in 2012, the gross debt to GDP ratio were respectively 7.0%, 41.3%, 
44.5% and 93.5%; the average recorded over the period 2001-12 reached 
respectively 7.3%, 36.7%, 43.5% and 75.3%). Nevertheless, the exclusive use 
of the criterion of “stock of debt” to assess the systemic importance of a 
financial activity presents major flaws and reveals the limits of the 
quantitative approach of consumer credit. Admittedly, in a context of 
increasing financial fragility, the corresponding value of the volume of non-
performing consumer loans might be much below housing loans and the 
implied systemic risk relatively low. However, on one hand, unexpected 
rising volumes of loans in arrears may be of concern for specific bank 
business models; on the other hand, the number of affected households and 
the real impact on individuals, the economy and society might be very 
significant and can hardly be assessed through a quantitative approach.  
New ways for improving the quantitative approach 
Economically speaking, the phenomenon of over-indebtedness in consumer 
credit is likely not to have a marked impact on the economic growth due to 
the low amounts involved. Nevertheless, from society’s perspective, over-
indebtedness in consumer credit can have three other significant impacts 
(World Bank, 2013):29    
 Social: over-indebtedness and the ensuing drops in available cash flow 
bring increased social stratification as well as worsening opportunities 
for the poor; 
                                                   
29 See also Civic Consulting (2014) and Banque de France (2014). 
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 Political: regulatory failure to limit over-indebtedness may discredit 
the political process as well as financial supervisors if the over-
indebtedness issue becomes widespread and politicised; 
 Perception of justice: predatory lenders may be seen as immune to 
prosecution when over-indebted clients fail to get protection in court. 
Therefore, one option to partly control for these effects when shaping 
monetary and macro-prudential policies would be to place further emphasis 
on constraints mirroring levels of risk judged as “socially acceptable”. Such 
constraints would try to find an appropriate balance between the 
commercial and financial risk-bearing capacity of FIs and the financial risk-
bearing capacity of households. This would imply that for any levels of credit 
and consumption growth, a maximum level of acceptable risks shared by 
both lenders and borrowers should be defined. For FIs, levels of costs judged 
as acceptable for a specific credit expansion should be set. As regards 
households, a maximum level of over-indebtedness or/and financial 
bankruptcies should be defined in the related models.    
At first, such an option may seem unrealistic and perhaps politically 
void. The integration and the emphasis of such constraints in 
macroeconomic models designed to conduct the monetary and macro-
prudential policies may indeed look very complex; nevertheless, the main 
challenge would most likely be empirical rather than theoretical. For 
example, as far as we know, there is currently no commonly accepted definition 
of over-indebtedness in the EU-28 and, as a result, no consistent methods to measure 
it. A 2010 European Commission study endeavoured to develop a common 
over-indebtedness definition across the EU and put forward a set of criteria 
to be applied for this purpose: 
 The unit of measurement should be the household because the income 
of individuals can be pooled – and indeed, is usually assumed to be 
pooled – between household members. 
 Indicators need to cover all financial commitments of households – 
borrowing for housing purposes, consumer credit, paying utility bills, 
meeting rent and mortgage payments and so on – and not to be 
confined to just one aspect. 
 Over-indebtedness implies an inability to meet recurring expenses 
and, therefore, it should be seen as an ongoing rather than a temporary, 
or one-off, state of affairs. 
 It is not possible to resolve the problem simply by borrowing further. 
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 For a household to meet its commitments, it must reduce its 
expenditure substantially (or find ways of increasing its income). 
However, such criteria, though they might be widely accepted in 
principle, give rise to serious problems when it comes to measurement. In 
order to promote sustainable growth, policy-makers need a practical tool to 
detect possible over-indebtedness (World Bank, 2013). To this end, several 
studies have converged on a common set of indicators (BIS 2010) and 
considered four aspects of over-indebtedness (see Table 3.4).   
Table 3.4 Common indicators of over-indebtedness 
Category Indicator 
Cost of servicing debt Households spending more than 30% (or 50%) 
of their gross monthly income on total 
borrowing repayments (secured and 
unsecured) 
Households spending more than 25% of their 
gross monthly income on unsecured 
repayments 
Households whose spending on total 
borrowing repayments takes them below the 
poverty line  
Being in arrears Households more than two months in arrears 
on a credit commitment or household bill 
Number of loans – heavy 
use of credit 
Households with four or more credit 
commitments 
Subjective perception of 
burden 
Households declaring that their borrowing 
repayments are a “heavy burden” 
Source: d’Alessio & Iezzi (2013). 
Recommendations 3.1 
 3.1.1 Promote consumer credit as a tool to boost macroeconomic 
private consumption and, as a consequence, real GDP growth. 
Consumer credit can play a noticeable role in the economic recovery 
in the EU-28 + EEA.  
 3.1.2 Promote research on the interactions between the dynamics in 
consumer credit markets and economic growth. 
 3.1.3 Promote research on the effect of the regulations of price-based 
ratios on the dynamics in household retail financial products such as 
consumer loans. 
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 3.1.4 Integrate and emphasise constraints reflecting “socially 
acceptable levels of macroeconomic risk” in macroeconomic models 
designed to conduct the monetary and macro-prudential policies. For 
microfounded macroeconomic models, policy-makers should keep in 
mind that it is necessary to maintain a satisfactory level of standard 
deviation of microeconomic risk. 
 3.1.5 Reinforce the consistency in the statistical measurement of over-
indebtedness across the EU-28 member states. 
 3.1.6 Develop practical tools to detect possible over-indebtedness, for 
example, by considering four key aspects of over-indebtedness: cost 
of servicing debt, being in arrears, the number of loans – heavy use 
of credit – and subjective perception of burden. 
3.2 Qualitative approach 
As shown in section 3.1, consumer credit can play a role in the economic 
recovery in the EU by supporting private consumption of households. 
However, consumer credit can also influence the type of consumption of 
households. This financial product has often been described as essential for 
specific economic sectors, such as in the case of the car industry or home 
appliances. By providing access to finance to individuals and households, 
consumer credit supports the social and economic well-being of millions of 
consumers across Europe. It also benefits manufacturers and retailers, as a 
key tool for their sales. Vehicles, higher education and home repairs are 
examples of assets and services financed by consumer credit. Going further 
into the reasoning, consumer credit can also influence the content of the 
consumed product or even services. 
The question here is to assess whether this consumer credit could 
significantly contribute to some of the priorities and targets of the Europe 
2020 strategy, one of whose main priorities is to deliver growth that is 
sustainable, by decisively moving towards a more competitive low-carbon 
economy. Most of the current European debate on the achievement of a low-
carbon economy focuses on the necessity of companies to use more 
sustainable resources and to provide more ecologically friendly products on 
retail and b-to-b markets. The debate is also promoting civic behaviour of 
households, who should sort their waste and limit their consumption of 
resources to what is vital. However, little is said about how households could 
afford ecologically designed products.   
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The energy transition promoted by the Europe 2020 strategy cannot 
focus only on non-financial corporations’ production processes; it must also 
focus on solutions enabling households to afford these products. Some 
initiatives already exist regarding the purchase of ecological cars through 
subsidies and tax cuts; however, these incentives are essentially local and 
very few initiatives have been taken regarding the funding possibilities of 
such products. 
In order to contribute to the achievement of the Europe 2020 targets, 
which aim at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% (or even 30% if the 
conditions are right), having 20% of energy from renewables and recording 
a 20% increase in energy efficiency, regulators should place further emphasis 
on the different means at the disposable of households to fund the purchase 
of ecologically designed products. Among these means, consumer credit 
products could be an interesting tool. Indeed, the set-up of an adapted 
framework for consumption finance could help households purchase 
ecodesign products, thereby leading to a new cycle of consumption and 
contributing to the development of new economic sectors with ecological 
concerns. 
In the car industry, the need to readjust the purchase of cars from those 
with diesel to those with clean-running engines has been promoted in many 
EU member states, and some financial incentives exist. But few use consumer 
credits as a support. New patents and new technologies will gradually lead 
to the mass production of electric cars (for example, Tesla Motors aimed at 
offering electric cars at prices affordable to the average consumer by 2017). 
This move in the consumption patterns from thermic to electric could be 
accelerated by the promotion of specific funding tools.  
Regarding appliances, consumer credit could participate in a 
progressive shift of household behaviour to the purchase of appliances that 
consume less electricity and less water. New information and 
communication technology (NICT) mobile equipment is also important in 
this respect.  
Finally, many investments in the housing sector depend on the access 
of households to appropriate consumer credits. The objective of making 
houses more environmentally friendly has also been served by financial 
incentives, but few or no policies have been implemented to ease the funding 
conditions necessary to achieve these investments. Some of the key 
investments involve thermal insulation for energy saving, phonic insulation 
and domestic renewable energy. 
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In this context, the “qualitative growth” objective of consumer credit 
is feasible only if the appropriate products are precisely defined and 
merchandised for these new markets. The Directive 2009/125/EC on 
ecodesign adopted by the EU on 21 October 2009 provides the EU framework 
for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related products. 
Thanks to this framework, regulations have been implemented on voluntary 
agreements for different groups of products (see Table 3.4). The use of 
labelling based on the regulations has raised the awareness of consumers on 
the energy efficiency of the purchased products and could ease the 
implementation of tax policies targeting funding conditions.  
One possibility to enhance energy transition in private consumption 
would therefore be to allow consumers to deduct all or part of the interest 
rates related to a loan funding ecodesign products. Such a policy would 
target primarily linked-loans and the deduction process in the tax 
declaration could be easily legitimated by the labelling of the product in 
terms of ecodesign. The deductibility of interest rates has been extensively 
practiced for housing loans in a certain number of EU countries (Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, etc.) in order to promote home ownership and 
support real estate developments. A similar process could be adopted for 
consumer loans: interest deduction based on the purchase of ecodesign 
products could have four main positive outcomes: 
 contributing to the energy transition in household private consumption, 
 creating growth opportunities for the household retail banking 
activities, 
 helping FIs to reinforce their legitimacy in the economy, notably by 
promoting their ethical features and 
 reconciling consumers with consumer credit.  
Nevertheless, should the regulator question the possibility of 
implementing such incentive tools to use consumer loans to fund 
consumption of eco-design products, strong analytical and empirical evidence 
will be required before any implementation is done. First of all, further research 
should be conducted on the real contribution of private consumption to the 
energy transition process. Provided that these findings confirm the key role 
of consumption habits in the possibility to achieve some of objectives of 2020 
Europe, further research will need to be developed on the potential role of 
consumption loans in that context. Only if well-founded studies confirm the 
strong link between consumer loan and energy transition, could regulators consider 
the use of tools such as tax breaks to help consumers fund their eco-design products 
through consumer loans.   
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Table 3.5 Implementing regulations for EU ecodesign legislation by product 
Type of product Regulation/Directive 
Power transformers Commission Regulation (EU) No 548/2014 of 21 
May 2014 
Domestic cooking 
appliance 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 66/2014 of 14 
January 2014  
Heaters and water 
heaters 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 813/2013 of 2 
August 2013 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 814/2013 of 2 
August 2013 
Vacuum cleaners Commission Regulation (EU) No 666/2013 of 8 July 
2013  
Computers Commission Regulation (EU) No 617/2013 of 26 
June 2013 
Energy star Regulation (EU) No 174/2013 of 5 February 2013  
Commission Decision 2014/202/EU of 20 March 
2014  
Household tumble 
driers 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 932/2012 of 3 
October 2012  
Circulators Commission Regulation (EU) No 622/2012 of 11 
July 2012  
Water pumps Commission regulation (EU) No 547/2012 of 25 
June 2012  
Industrial fans Commission Regulation (EU) No 327/2011 of 30 
March 2011  
Household 
dishwashers 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1016/2010 of 10 
November 2010  
Household washing 
machines 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1015/2010 of 10 
November 2010  
Lighting products in 
the domestic and 
tertiary sectors 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1194/2012 of 12 
December 2012  
Commission Regulation (EU) No 347/2010 of 21 
April 2010  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 859/2009 of 18 
September 2009  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 244/2009 of 18 
March 2009  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 245/2009  
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Refrigerators and 
freezers 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 643/2009 of 22 
July 2009  
Televisions Commission Regulation (EC) No 642/2009 of 22 
July 2009  
Electric motors Commission Regulation (EU) No 4/2014 of 6 
January 2014  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 640/2009 of 22 
July 2009  
External power 
supplies 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 278/2009 of 6 
April 2009  
Simple set-top boxes Commission Regulation (EC) No 107/2009 of 4 
February 2009  
Standby and off mode 
electric power 
consumption of 
household and office 
equipment 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 801/2013 of 22 
August 2013  
Source: European Commission. 
 
Recommendation 3.2 
 3.2.1 Study the role of household private consumption in the “energy 
transition” process upheld notably by the Europe 2020 strategy and 
assess which role consumer loans could play in that context.  
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CHAPTER 4. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
APPROACH 
 significant part of policies conducted at European or national level 
are intended to correct the different dysfunctions that may occur in 
the structure of credit markets. All in all, at microeconomic level, 
there are two main types of dysfunctions that might lead to market failures: 
information asymmetries between distributors/originators and borrowers, 
and behavioural biases of borrowers.  
Asymmetric information can be present on both the lender and the 
borrower sides in any credit market. Owing to their greater experience and 
knowledge of the financial products they are in charge of selling, lenders are 
expected to have more information on the features of the products than 
consumers are. As a result, they might have some incentives to exploit 
existing asymmetries of information to boost sales to the detriment of 
consumers. Furthermore, constant financial innovation admittedly leads to 
more choices for consumers and should therefore raise their welfare; 
however, financial innovation may result in higher product complexity and 
therefore should contribute to further information asymmetries, by 
introducing potential difficulties for borrowers to understand the pattern of 
costs/returns and the risks embedded (de Manuel et al., 2014). In this 
context, lenders may have incentives to exploit existing and new information 
asymmetries in their own interests (moral hazard), notably by selling 
consumer loans which are not necessarily in the customer’s best interest. 
On the other hand, customers typically have more information on their 
financial situation than the lenders. As a result, even though they are likely 
to be aware of the potential difficulties in reimbursing the loan, some 
borrowers may be prone to providing a biased assessment of their own 
financial situation in order to contract loans. 
The second type of potential market dysfunction can be sparked by 
behavioural biases of consumers. In short, behavioural economics tries to 
show that consumers do not systematically choose their products in their 
best interests, as their behaviour and purchasing strategies are markedly 
influenced by specific context and psychological factors. More specifically, 
three cognitive limits may induce the violation of rational assumptions (Jolls 
et al., 2000): 
A
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(1) Bounded rationality: limits faced by human beings in terms of 
accessible information, mental capacity and available time (Simon, 
1957). 
(2) Bounded willpower: people act in conflict with their long-term 
interests, even though they anticipate negative effects in so doing, e.g. 
smoking, overspending today instead of saving for old age (de Manuel 
et al., 2014). 
(3) Bounded self-interest: people care about treating others fairly because 
they want to be treated in the same way: agents will act ‘nicer’ or 
‘nastier’ depending on how the other party treats them. 
These limitations in the ability of consumers to maximise their welfare 
can trigger two specific market dysfunctions. Firstly, owing to their cognitive 
limitations, consumers might not capture, process and use the available 
information in an optimal manner. Secondly, certain characteristics of the 
consumer loans or the sellers’ strategies might have been designed 
intentionally to exploit consumer misconceptions and this exploitation 
might lead to a significant decrease in consumer welfare.30 For example, 
some innovations in the mortgage market in the years preceding the 2008-09 
financial crisis targeted financially constrained households and offered 
products with variable interest rates and repayment schemes secured by 
unrealistic housing prospects. Overconfidence was present on both sides – 
the lenders and the borrowers – and these products were designed partly in 
response to the temporal discounting bias of some customers, i.e. the tendency 
to discount future gains more than losses.  
Persistent information asymmetries and behavioural biases of 
consumers are likely to spark market dysfunctions, primarily to the 
detriment of customers’ welfare and, to a lesser extent, to the detriment of 
credit providers. Against this backdrop, public interventions are necessary, 
especially to enhance consumer protection, and often result from some 
                                                   
30 For many financial products and selling strategies, the determination of an 
appropriate distinction between intentional and unintentional can be challenging, 
especially in a given environment of relatively high competition, continuous 
marketing campaigns and permanent financial innovation. All in all, product design 
is sensitive to drivers of demand and many of those drivers have a noticeable 
behavioural bias content. Therefore, it makes sense for regulators to intervene only 
if this exploitation leads to a significant decrease in consumer welfare. 
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combination of information disclosure requirements and responsible 
lending31 as well as borrowing rules. 
As such, this chapter will first focus on policies enhancing information 
disclosure requirements, their pros and cons and their ability to improve the 
setup of an effective market of consumer loans. Then, some emphasis will be 
placed on policies aimed at improving responsible lending of FIs. This 
second range of policies will follow a lifecycle framework, by highlighting a 
pre-contractual approach and a reimbursement approach. Finally, the third 
section will propose a possible alternative approach to traditional policies 
based on information disclosure and responsible lending.  
Box 2. Behavioural economics and consumer protection 
An increasingly popular topic 
As analysed by Harford (2014), behavioural economics has become 
increasingly popular in recent years. In 2002, the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
economics was awarded to the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, a researcher 
often considered as one of the main contributors to the creation of behavioural 
economics. A decade later, in 2013, a behavioural economist, Robert Shiller, 
was given the Nobel Prize amid much praise and publicity. In the meantime, 
several bestselling books have been published on the topic, notably by Ariely 
(Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions, 2008), Thaler 
& Sunstein (Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, 
2008) and Kahneman (Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011).  
Resulting in part from the popularity of the topic, public policy is using 
behavioural economics to an increasing extent to design better policies. In the 
UK, the Behavioural Insight Team (BIT) was set up by the coalition 
government in 2010 to apply insights of behavioural economics to 
government policy and was partly privatised in February 2014 for the purpose 
of advising foreign governments on that matter.32 Still in the UK, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), which was formed by the UK government in 
spring 2013 with the objective of regulating financial firms providing services 
to consumers, published its first Occasional Paper on “Applying behavioural 
economics at the Financial Conduct Authority”. 
                                                   
31 Responsible borrowing standards may also be relevant but are not addressed in 
the present report. 
32 In this context, the BIT developed a new policy framework that integrated simple 
principles to use behavioural insights in an efficient manner: “in order to encourage 
a behaviour, make it Easy, Attractive, Social and Timely (EAST).”  
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Across the Atlantic, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
an independent agency of the United States government founded in 2011 and 
responsible for consumer protection in the financial sector, relies significantly 
on behavioural economics when conducting research on consumer 
behaviour.33 In addition, the White House officially launched its own Social 
and Behavioural Sciences Team in January 2014, partly modelled on the UK’s 
BIT and covering a broad scope of topics.  
Finally, in the European institutions, the Commission has shown 
growing interest in the possibilities offered by behavioural economics when 
designing consumer protection regulations, especially in the field of retail 
finance. Various conferences and workshops on this topic have recently been 
organised, notably by DG Consumer Affairs and DG Internal Market and 
Services.34 In 2010, the DG Consumer Affairs conducted its first behavioural 
study on consumers’ decision-making in retail investment services, showing 
that simpler and standardised product information significantly improves 
investors’ decisions. In February 2014, the Mortgage Credit Directive was 
adopted with some elements partially based on behavioural insights (notably 
with some recommendations on the framing of some disclosed information). 
And it seems there is more to come.     
A complex discipline, object of several criticisms 
Until recently, policies regarding consumer behaviour and protection were 
(or pretended to be?) mostly influenced by neoclassical economics and, as 
such, have relied on “analytic, a priori analyses of the making of rational 
decisions” (Shafir, 2008). While it is rather normatively based, this model, 
commonly known as the ‘rational agent’, had been the main conceptual 
framework promoted in academic and policy spheres and gradually shaped 
economics and the design and conduct of policy. However, an alternative 
approach, developed originally by Thaler (1980) has progressively gained 
momentum in policy-making circles and has challenged the neoclassical key 
assumption of ‘rational agent’. 
                                                   
33 One of the main promoters of the CFPB set-up, e.g. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, was a 
strong advocate of the use of behavioural insights at the CFPB (see 
www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2011/06/17/the-soft-power-of-the-
consumer-financial-protection-bureau/) and the Academic Research Council of the 
CFPB includes notable behavioural economists such as Richard H. Thaler.  
34 For example, the conference on emerging challenges in retail finance and 
consumer policy, jointly organised by DG Justice and Consumers and DG Financial 
Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, on 18 November 2014 had 
an entire session devoted to “behavioural economics and financial services”.  
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This theory, commonly named behavioural economics, “combines economics 
and psychology to produce a body of evidence that individual choice 
behaviour departs noticeably from the one predicted by neoclassical 
economics in a number of decision making situations” (Ginsburg et al., 2012). 
The departures from rational-choice behaviour are supposed to result from an 
individual’s ‘cognitive biases’, often defined by behavioural economists as 
systematic failures of consumers to act in their own interest because of defects 
in their decision-making process.  
The rising popularity of the behavioural economics approach among 
policy-makers has sparked several criticisms regarding its soundness and 
foundations, especially by some notable psychologists. Among the most 
prominent critics, Gigerenzer (2009) argues that “the individual has a biased 
mind and ignores part of the available information, yet a biased mind can 
handle uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind 
relying on more resource-intensive and general-purpose processing 
strategies”. However, these models can hardly help us understand the way 
households budget their spending or choose a particular type of consumer 
loan (Harford, 2014). More generally, the main criticism of behavioural 
economics concerns the attempt of this discipline to formulate general laws of 
human behaviour, while problem-solving approaches are rather ad hoc and 
vary noticeably from one individual to another.35 As such, many critics 
conclude that behavioural economics can hardly provide consistent 
guidelines for policy design.  
Some other ardent critics place the focus on the philosophical and 
political issues of applying behavioural insights to policy-making. These 
critiques denounce the paternalistic drift of such an approach, which in the 
end could pose a significant threat not only to the right of free enterprise, but 
also to the freedom to choose and hence “to err in making important 
decisions” (Ginsburg et al., 2012).  
  
                                                   
35 As a result, most of the empirical research on this topic considers a specific market 
and/or product, within a given economic, sociological and cultural environment, 
and produces findings that are hardly consistent with other markets or 
environments. 
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Table 4.1 Behavioural biases of particular relevance to financial products 
Psychology of 
scarcity  
Day-to-day challenges and 
stress, especially those 
associated with poverty, 
leave little room for error 
and can drain mental 
resources and actually make 
it difficult to make good 
decisions.  
Consumers of different income 
levels perform equally well 
when presented with low-
value financial decisions, but 
performance of lower-income 
consumers deteriorates when 
the value of the financial 
decision increases.  
Availability  The memories that come to 
mind are not always the ones 
that are most helpful, or even 
the ones a person wants to 
remember. Instead, some 
memories are simply more 
likely to come to mind, 
especially those that are 
associated with strong 
emotions.  
Consumers have greater recall 
of negative experiences of 
peers presenting complaints to 
financial institutions, and so 
are disinclined to attempt to 
have their own complaint 
resolved.  
Hassle factors  Small barriers such as filling 
out forms or waiting in lines. 
While these costs may seem 
trivial, reducing or relieving 
them can have an outsized 
impact.  
Consumers may fail to submit 
a complaint due to perceived 
inconveniences like having to 
speak with someone in a 
branch or fill out forms.  
Hyperbolic 
discounting  
Greatly discounting future 
costs or benefits relative to 
immediate costs or benefits.  
Expensive consumer credit 
seems like a good deal to cover 
short-term needs, even if the 
long-term costs are significant.  
Information and 
choice conflict  
An increase of options may 
make it more difficult for 
consumers to select a single 
option.  
Consumers who want to 
purchase insurance may end 
up not doing so when 
presented with too many plans 
or options presented in diverse 
ways, making it difficult to 
compare choices.  
Positive framing  Presenting information or 
choices in a way that 
accentuates positive aspects 
of the consequences or 
outcomes. Whether a choice 
is framed in a positive or 
negative way can have a 
huge impact on how people 
Messaging that links money 
with specific goals leads to 
higher saving rates than if 
saving intentions are left vague 
or broad.  
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evaluate the choice. Framing 
the future in a positive way 
can motivate people to work 
hard to attain the positive 
outcome.  
Present bias  Weighing present concerns 
more than future ones. 
People make plans to do 
unpleasant tasks 
“tomorrow” – and make the 
same choice to put the action 
off when “tomorrow” 
becomes “today”!  
A consumer opens a savings 
account with the intention of 
depositing regularly, but her 
balance quickly falls to zero as 
she fails to deposit each day in 
favour of paying for daily 
temptations and expenses.  
Social norming  Behaviour and actions that 
are driven by actual or 
perceived behaviour of a 
peer group.  
Informing citizens how many 
of their peers have already paid 
taxes increases the likelihood 
they will pay their own taxes.  
Note: This list is meant to be indicative, not exhaustive. Additionally, specific biases likely 
manifest in different ways depending on context, so this is representative, rather than 
definitive. It is also difficult to link an observed behavioural tendency with one single 
explanation from behavioural research; often, multiple psychological biases can help to 
explain and understand a specific human behaviour, rather than just one. 
Source: Mazer et al. (2014). 
4.1 Information disclosure policies 
Principles 
The first strategy focuses on the type of information FIs are required to 
disclose. In the context of household loans, there are three phases to consider: 
advertising phase, pre-contractual phase and contractual phase. The 
information provided during the first two phases is essential to helping 
customers make appropriate choices and opt for the financial product which 
corresponds best to their needs. The last phase provides the information on 
the rights and responsibilities of both the lender and the borrower for an 
appropriate execution of the contract. The purpose of contractual 
information is also to have a clear reference document in case of litigation. It 
is generally divided between general and particular conditions and includes 
all or part of the pre-contractual information. The disclosure of contractual 
information may influence the final choice of customers regarding the 
preferred financial product, even though customers are less likely to turn 
back once they enter the third phase. 
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At European level, the CCD and the MCD contain several provisions 
on information disclosure during the three phases, as one of their main goals 
is to harmonise as much as possible the obligatory information included in 
these three phases (see in particular the Standard European Consumer 
Credit Information and the European Standardised Information Sheet).  
Advantages 
Disclosure policy is often at the base of consumer policy, as it is likely to be 
less controversial and complicated to implement than some other policies 
aimed at improving customer outcomes (such as suitability requirements or 
restrictions on certain product features). Disclosure is indeed based on the 
principle of ‘buyer beware’, which assumes that if information is transparent 
and readily accessible, the burden of choice and subsequent outcomes 
should fall predominantly on the customer (Mazer et al., 2014).  
At the core of this policy, the CCD (as well as the Mortgage Credit 
Directive) places the emphasis on a standardised way to calculate the annual 
percentage rate (APR). The objective of such a policy is twofold: 
- on the supplier side, to encourage fair competition by pressuring firms 
to compete on price and quality and 
- to help consumers in their decision-making process. 
As such, disclosure policies are designed not only for the benefit of consumers, 
but also of producers.  
On the lender side, clearer and standardised disclosure should result 
in common terminology and standards, thereby reducing administration 
costs of bringing new products to the market. To a certain extent, this type 
of disclosure framework should favour ‘healthy’ financial innovation and 
should also contribute to the reinforcement of transparency in consumer 
credit markets; such disclosure policies are in line with the objective of 
mitigating information asymmetries and their negative effects, and appear 
to be essential to maintaining effective credit markets with fair competition. 
At an aggregate level, systematic marked distortions in the quality and 
harmonisation of the available information are indeed likely to result in 
artificial opportunities for growth and sub-optimal market equilibriums. 
On the consumer side, one of the main advantages of standardised disclosure 
is to alleviate search costs. In a context where products have standardised 
information, consumers should be more capable of comparing products and 
the selection of the product should correspond further to the real need of the 
customers. Nevertheless, the implementation of harmonised disclosure 
contains several pitfalls. 
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Disadvantages 
First of all, many consumers typically do not shop around when seeking a financial 
product (Mazer et al., 2014). According to the EC (2010) in its study on 
“Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural 
Economics Perspective”, only one investor in three compares investments 
from more than one provider or considers more than one product from a 
single provider. The corresponding figures for consumer credits are likely to 
be broadly similar. Many customers establish partnerships with FIs based on 
time and trust, especially in some EU countries. In that case, standardised 
information disclosure aimed at easing comparability can have a significant 
impact only if the lender proposes different products to his customer; the 
question on ethics of the lender is essential within this framework and 
should be addressed by policies based on the approach of responsible 
lending (see section 4.2).36  
Another question triggered by these analyses is to assess to what extent 
standardised information could encourage customers to shop around. To 
our knowledge, no empirical study confirms the positive impact of a 
standardised annual percentage rate (APR) on the share of consumers 
comparing products. Due to the low enforcement of the disclosure 
requirements adopted within the CCD, such a survey would be difficult to 
conduct at the EU level. The report on CCD implementation published by 
the Commission on 14 May 2014 indeed finds that:37 
- only 22% of advertisement correctly discloses the standard 
information required; 
- information on costs is not clearly disclosed; 
- 27% of advertisements with cost information do not provide a 
representative example; and 
- in only about a half of advertisements with sufficient information does 
the APR seem to be correctly calculated.  
Therefore, according to this survey, further enforcement is needed 
before assessing the impact of the CCD information disclosure on the desire 
of consumers to shop around. 
Secondly, by considering only customers who shop around, several 
empirical studies question the ability of information disclosure policies to 
                                                   
36 Nevertheless, as developed in the last part of the report, the fast growth of digital 
banking and comparability websites is expected to boost the share of customers 
shopping around.    
37 See European Commission (b2014). 
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improve financial decision-making (Willis, 2005; de Meza et al., 2008; 
Agarwal et al., 2009). Findings of these studies confirm that even though 
customers have better information, they do not always choose the optimal 
option. There are five main reasons to explain the difficulty customers have 
in making appropriate decisions despite improved information, each of 
these reasons implying specific policy recommendations.  
Reason 1: Firms often shroud the high prices for complementary add-ons 
As developed notably by Gabaix et al. (2005), firms often shroud the high 
prices for complementary add-ons, hereby revealing a typical case of 
information asymmetry. The authors identify conditions under which 
shrouding survives in competitive equilibrium and show that competition 
will not induce firms to reveal information that would improve market 
efficiency. Firms will not educate the public about the add-on market, even 
when unshrouding is free. The 2014 report on CCD implementation confirms 
this view, as still very few FIs advertised cost information with a 
representative example despite the fact that the CCD had been transposed 
for a few years in most EU member states. Better enforcement of the 
disclosure provisions in the CCD could partly resolve this problem. 
Reason 2: The quantity of information is too great 
Even though they do have all the necessary information, consumers do not 
choose the optimal option, simply because the quantity of information is too 
great. This question of quantity is especially important for the contractual 
phase, when lenders often have to disclose contractual information to 
comply with both the European and domestic requirements. Too often, 
European requirements are simply added to the domestic ones, resulting in 
a tremendous amount of information that very few customers consider. This 
‘quantity race’ can be heightened by FIs themselves for legal protection 
purposes. In order to be covered in case of litigation, many FIs indeed add 
some contractual information, notably by placing some focus on borrowers’ 
responsibilities in case of difficulties. In the end, whatever is the policy 
choice, both domestic and European regulators, as well as FIs, should keep in 
mind that too much information tends to be counterproductive. Most likely, there 
exists a threshold in terms of quantity of information beyond which any 
added information, whatever its pertinence, may act as a drag on the ability 
of customers to choose the best option.  
An appropriate quantity of disclosed information at all stages of the 
“loan process” is essential in order to ensure the setup of an “efficient 
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market”. Indeed, the overload of information can result in marked market 
dysfunctionalities, as consumers are discouraged from finding the needed 
information. In theory, large amounts of disclosed information should help 
alleviate the endemic problem of information asymmetries in household 
credit markets, but in practice, “too much information kills the information” 
and the problem of information asymmetries remains or is even higher. 
Reason 3: Consumers do not understand the available product information 
Even though they do have all the necessary information and the quantity of 
information available is “reasonable”, consumers do not necessarily choose 
the optimal option, simply because they do not understand the available 
product information. Behavioural economics can offer multiple perspectives 
on these issues, by providing food for thought on the different biases of 
consumers. For instance, APR is a complex statistic that can be 
misunderstood: some people believe that an APR of 10% means that the 
interest charged would be 10% of the amount borrowed regardless of loan 
duration; others believe that it is a rate measure based on the initial, not the 
average, amount borrowed (McHugh et al., 2011). In Box 3, Rob Ranyard 
proposes different information disclosure options to improve the 
understanding of financial information by purchasers of consumer loans, 
notably by publishing more comprehensive comparable information than 
APR. The author considers the following options: 
- for all fixed repayment credit, clearly presenting the monthly 
repayment, the loan duration and either the financial charges or total 
cost; 
- financial charge per month (or relevant instalment period); 
- for revolving credit, the publication on monthly account statements of 
total costs and loan duration for a range of monthly repayments. 
In the context of “Reason 2” and “Reason 3”, the head of the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) recently declared 
(June 2014) for the case of insurance and pension products that: “giving more 
information doesn’t work. Most people don’t read or understand the lengthy 
pages containing complicated product information…What we need is ‘smart 
disclosure’, with a focus on consumers”. In other words, the information 
disclosed should be reasonable in quantity, easily understood by most consumers and 
target primarily the main needs of consumers. As such, the setup of a hierarchy 
of customer needs with a specific ranking for each need, although somewhat 
awkward, is likely help reinforce the efficiency of policies based on 
mandatory information disclosures.  
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Box 3. Cost disclosure in the retail credit market: research and policy implications* 
Consumer borrowing has been described as a decision-making process with 
three stages (see Kamleitner & Kirchler, 2007 and Kamleitner et al., 2012). 
First, deciding whether to spend or not, or to defer spending; and if deciding 
to spend, whether to fund it from current assets or income, or from expected 
future income, i.e. borrowing now and repaying later. The second stage 
involves choosing a specific credit option, while the third focuses on the 
management of repayments. From the point of view of rational lifecycle 
theory it makes sense to borrow sometimes, to maximise satisfaction across 
the lifespan. There are, however, significant psychological factors underlying 
the decision to borrow. For example, in our ongoing research on spending and 
borrowing at Christmas (McNair et al., 2013), we found that willingness to 
borrow was inversely related to money management skills, and positively 
related to two psychological variables: a maladaptive coping style based on 
denial, and materialistic values. This suggests that support for money 
management and financial literacy could be more effective if these related 
psychological issues were addressed as well. 
The aim of this article is to summarise research findings concerning the 
second and third stages of the borrowing decision process and briefly 
consider their policy implications. The focus is the cost and loan duration 
information that borrowers require both for informed credit choice, and for 
repayment decisions with revolving credit agreements such as credit cards. 
We have considered these issues from a mental accounting perspective, first 
introduced by Shefrin & Thaler (1988), proposing that borrowers can 
represent instalment credit in terms of two alternative mental accounts: a total 
account, in which all future repayments are treated as equivalent to a current 
cost, added together to give the total cost of the loan; and a recurrent budget 
period account, whereby each future monthly budget period is seen as 
equivalent, or similar to, the current budget period. In the latter case, each 
future repayment is integrated into its associated budget period, so that the 
weekly or monthly repayment amount is the most important aspect of cost. 
The loan duration, or number of budget periods in which the repayment is 
required, is also important from this perspective (see Ranyard & Craig, 1995). 
The annual percentage rate (APR) measure of credit cost 
The first issue to consider is the role of APR in credit choice. On the positive 
side, it is a widely accepted standard of comparison based on a standard time 
period that is easy to use with a simple ‘take the best APR’ rule. In fact, in our 
research (Ranyard et al., 2006), we have found that many people use APR 
appropriately in this way. On the negative side, however, APR is a complex 
statistic that can be misunderstood: some people believe that an APR of 10%, 
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for example, means that the interest charged would be 10% of amount 
borrowed regardless of loan duration; others believe that it is a rate measure 
based on the initial, not the average amount borrowed (McHugh et al., 2011). 
It has even been reported that a few credit card users believe that a higher 
APR indicates a cheaper loan. Finally, we have found that with flexible credit, 
estimates of the loan duration or total cost are less accurate when APR is given 
(Ranyard & Craig, 1993). 
So while it is useful for many borrowers, the understanding of APR 
needs further support: perhaps by the teaching and learning of an 
approximate APR formula (Yard, 2004), essentially drawing attention to 
APR’s relation to the average, rather than the initial loan. Second, an 
additional measure of relative cost, the financial charge per week or month, 
could be routinely provided. This is a user-friendly measure on a familiar 
scale that can be used to compare credit options for the same amount but 
different APRs or different repayment schedules. 
Financial charge and total cost information 
Other important aspects of the cost of borrowing are the financial charge, 
which is the sum of all charges incurred during the lifetime of the loan, and 
the total cost, which is the amount borrowed plus the financial charge. These 
are limited because they are absolute measures that don’t take into account 
the duration of the loan. Nevertheless, they are easy to understand and 
consistent with one of the ways that people naturally think about instalment 
credit, in terms of the total account mentioned earlier. In addition, we have 
found that: 1) with revolving credit, estimates of loan duration are more 
accurate when total cost is given (McHugh & Ranyard, 2012); 2) total cost 
information moderates the effect of APR in credit decisions (European 
Commission, 2014); and 3) together with loan duration information, it leads 
to higher credit card repayments (Gross & Souleles, 2002). 
In view of these and related findings, the following can be suggested 
with respect to presenting cost information. First, as presently required in 
most countries, an accurate value of the APR of all credit offers should be 
disclosed clearly at an appropriate point in the sales process. Disturbingly, a 
recent survey by the European Commission found that APRs advertised by 
some lenders across the EU were often substantially inaccurate (Soman & 
Cheema, 2002). Second, for all fixed repayment credit, a clear presentation of 
the monthly repayment, the loan duration and either the financial charge or 
total cost is essential. In addition, we would like to see the financial charge per 
month (or relevant instalment period) presented so that the relative cost of 
loans for the same amount and duration can be compared more transparently. 
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Finally, for revolving credit, we recommend that total cost and loan duration 
information for a range of monthly repayments should be presented on 
monthly account statements. 
Credit limit and minimum repayment information 
Two items of information on credit card statements, credit limits and the 
required minimum repayment, have been found to affect spending and 
borrowing in unintended ways. On the former, it has been found that 
borrowers can interpret credit limits as a signal for their future income, and 
also that higher credit limits encourage spending (Stewart, 2009 and 
Hershfield & Roese, 2014). This leads to the suggestion that lenders should set 
credit limits with reference to its affordability for a reasonable loan duration.  
On minimum repayment information, research has shown (Navarro-
Martinez et al. 2011) that its mere presence acts as an anchor for repayment 
decisions, and those who repay more than the minimum are influenced by it. 
Secondly, it has been shown that raising minimum repayments raises 
borrowers’ repayment levels more than proportionately. This leads to the 
suggestion that regulations for a minimum repayment level above 2% should 
be considered (it has been calculated that with APR of 14%, repaying at 2% of 
the balance takes about 19 years). If, however, the level of minimum 
repayment were set too high, missed payments could become problematic.   
Other supplementary information 
There has been some recent research investigating ways to mitigate the 
anchoring effect of minimum repayment information. While informing 
borrowers of the long-term consequences of repaying only the minimum had 
little effect, informing them additionally of the repayment necessary to repay 
in three years, as required by the US CARD Act of 2010, increased the 
proportion of credit card users repaying at that level, and sometimes raises 
the proportion repaying more than that amount. However, it has also been 
reported that a significant number of users may pay less when the three-year 
payment amount was less than they would have paid otherwise. 
Nevertheless, we have found in a recent study that anchors higher than three-
year repayment amounts increase the proportion of users repaying at or 
above such higher levels. This reinforces the policy suggestion made earlier 
for revolving credit: total cost and loan duration information for a range of 
monthly repayments should be presented on monthly credit card statements. 
* We are grateful to Task Force member Rob Ranyard of the University of Leeds for 
contributing the text in this box. 
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Reason 4: Specific presentation of the information may have an impact on 
consumers’ choices 
Some findings of behavioural economics place emphasis on the impact of a 
specific presentation of the information on consumers’ choices. Some 
companies do comply with disclosure requirements, however they can be 
biased in the transfer of information by highlighting specific elements and 
covering some others, depending on marketing strategies. The question is 
therefore “how the information is disclosed?”, rather than “which 
information is disclosed?”   
Some initiatives were already taken in several member states to 
promote the incorporation of warnings in the disclosed information, such as, 
“Be careful, borrowing money also costs money”. In general, empirical 
studies and surveys demonstrate the positive impact of warnings on 
consumer behaviour (Cox et al., 1997 and Chater et al., 2010). In the former 
article, consumers were more likely to react to an adviser remuneration 
disclosure if it incorporated warnings. The authors tested a number of 
disclosure statements including the addition of the second sentence (with 
and without emphasis) of “The advisor will be paid proportional to what 
you invest. Notice that this means that the advisor did not necessarily have 
your own investment earnings in mind when he gave his advice”. Typically, 
there appears to be much greater scope to provide warnings to consumers in 
the purchase of high-risk products, especially products with high interest 
rates. 
However, policies promoting the use of warnings have also some 
limits. Firstly, the effectiveness of warnings depend on a number of factors, 
in particular, good design (Argo and Main, 2002) and it seems difficult to 
regulate such characteristics. The final decision will be taken by micro-
prudential supervision, which, in certain member states, is already granted 
the power to decide if a leaflet related to a financial product presents the 
required financial information in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, warning 
labels can have counterproductive effects on the behaviour of FIs, as they 
give the possibility to lenders to avoid or reduce their liability. As such, the 
use of warnings could partly reduce incentives for responsible lending by 
FIs. Thirdly, in line with the effects of warnings observed in the tobacco 
industry, policies promoting the use of warnings are likely to have little 
effect on overconfident customers. Finally, warnings could reduce well-
being if they make some people feel worse without changing their behaviour 
(Tooth, 2012). 
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Reason 5: Regulatory efforts in improving disclosure may come at an 
opportunity cost of regulatory efforts elsewhere  
Finally, as analysed by Tooth (2012), regulatory efforts in improving 
disclosure may come at an opportunity cost of regulatory efforts elsewhere: 
excessive focus on improving product disclosure may distract regulators 
from more effective methods of addressing poor decision-making by 
consumers. One of the main concerns in the CCD implementation seems to 
be the inconsistent application of required information disclosure and the 
significant resources allocated to improve the enforcement of these 
provisions. Such resources could be used for designing new provisions, 
better adapted to the evolution of the financial markets. 
Recommendations 4.1 
 4.1.1 Promote further enforcement of the CCD, especially regarding 
advertised cost information with a representative example. 
 4.1.2 Enhance the design and implementation of policies where the 
information disclosure requirements at the advertising stage, pre-
contractual stage and contractual stage should be reasonable in 
quantity, easily understood by most consumers and targeted 
primarily towards the main needs of consumers. 
 4.1.3 Overall, promote further research into the optimum amount and 
structure of informational material that consumers are prepared to 
take into consideration when deciding on financial products, 
particularly consumer loans.  
 4.1.4 Enhance the use by regulators and FIs of a specific ranking for 
each type of customer needs in terms of information, in order to 
reinforce the efficiency of policies based on information disclosure.   
 4.1.5 Promote the use of simpler tools than APR to help customers 
compare the financial services available.  
 4.1.6 Promote the use of warnings in the disclosed information (by 
also considering the limits of such practices). 
4.2 Responsible lending policies 
Regulators have also highlighted the need for ethical behaviour across the 
retail financial industry. The driving force behind this regulatory strategy 
can be summarised in the motto “Provide customers with financial services 
they need and can afford”. Overall, some elements of this approach are 
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rather vague, as the necessary innovation process occurring in the financial 
industry leads to constant redefinitions of the concept of “needs”; however, 
the “can afford” principle is likely to offer a sounder base for further 
recommendations, notably by enhancing the responsible lending approach of 
FIs. Responsible lending policies – typically requiring lenders to offer credit 
only if the borrower must be reasonably expected to repay the loan without 
substantial hardship – place greater responsibility on the lender to ensure 
that lending is consistent with the interests of the borrower. It also 
encourages FIs to develop appropriate follow-up of the financial capacity of 
customers to reimburse the loan during the whole contractual period. As 
such, the traditional business model of FIs is likely to be redefined markedly 
in the coming decades. 
Article 45 of the MCD, “Further initiatives on responsible lending and 
borrowing”, provides the possibility for the Commission to submit a 
comprehensive report assessing the wider challenges of private over-
indebtedness directly linked to credit activity, hereby leading to possible 
legislative proposals. Nevertheless, it is mentioned that the deadline of such 
a report would be only “by 21 March 2019”.  
The CCD does contain some provisions on the necessity of the lenders 
to assess the consumer’s creditworthiness (Article 8 in the CCD) but does not 
include any specific measures on over-indebtedness (see, however, Recitals 
26 and 27).     
At macroeconomic level, within the growth approach, we analysed 
that central banks should integrate further tools to control for possible over-
indebtedness, the main challenge being the absence of consistent 
methodologies across the EU member states to measure over-indebtedness. 
But, the question of over-indebtedness and its prevention is also essential at the seller 
level and similar questions remain on its definition. Policy orientations aimed at 
preventing over-indebtedness at both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
levels are twofold. On one hand, some specific policies target practices before 
the signature of contracts (pre-contract approach); on the other hand, some 
other tools are designed to promote a better follow-up during the repayment 
period (reimbursement approach).  
Relationship with the client: Pre-contractual approach 
In the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis, increased macroeconomic 
focus has been placed on the necessity to implement appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms at an early stage in credit market development, to detect 
potential debt stress (reflecting market segment on the road to over-
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indebtedness) and prevent ill-considered lending practices, thereby 
avoiding risks to financial markets, consumers’ and the regulators’ 
credibility (Davel, 2013). Lender practices and borrower behaviour are at the core 
of policies aimed at curbing debt stress. 
Policies aimed at reinforcing responsible lending typically assume that 
lenders are often in a better position to assume the optimal level of 
borrowing, owing to their greater experience in loan contracts than 
borrowers. As a result, lenders are supposed to be less prone to behavioural 
biases such as overconfidence or biased risk assessment (Tooth, 2012). 
However, in a specific context (especially when the economy is booming, as 
was the case in the years preceding the financial crisis), sales agents can also 
suffer from overconfidence. In addition, against the backdrop of ambitious 
commercial targets and high sales inducement practices, lenders may lack 
incentives to ensure that the lending is reasonable. The absence of 
responsible lending requirements could prompt some specific sellers to 
exploit the behavioural biases of customers in an inappropriate manner, 
especially in the case of the most vulnerable consumers. In recent years, 
researchers and policy-makers have gradually placed emphasis on two main 
types of consumer biases (very present among the most vulnerable 
consumers): tunnelling and temporal discounting. 
The former has been extensively developed by Mullainathan et al. 
(2013) in their best-seller Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. The 
author defines “tunnelling” as the behaviour of consumers focusing 
disproportionately on the task at hand, at the expense of other equally or 
more important tasks. Some customers struggling to pay their bills may 
ignore financial management principles and could be susceptible to taking 
out loans they might not be able to afford.  However, there is also 
countervailing evidence that a significant proportion of consumers on lower 
incomes make considered decisions and trade-offs and deliberately choose 
credit products that they know will mesh with their personal 
circumstances.38    
                                                   
38 For example, the 2011 report “Making Ends Meet” by Consumer Focus in the 
UK concluded: “The precariousness of low-income consumers’ finances and 
personal circumstances means that they often have to prioritise 
control…clarity…and convenience…over long-term cost. Unlike more affluent 
consumers, they cannot afford to take the risk of the fees and penalty charges for 
missed payments that come with more mainstream products. Instead, many low-
income consumers rely on more expensive payment methods and financial 
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The latter refers to a time-inconsistent model of discounting. Some 
customers tend to discount future gains more than losses. In other words, 
these decision-makers feel disconnected from their future selves, an 
experience that leads them to prefer smaller immediate gains to large future 
gains. Both biases are typically involved in cases of multiple debts and 
should be continuously and carefully addressed in sales strategies of FIs.   
Going beyond the case of the most vulnerable consumers, some voices 
have been raised in recent years to favour policies aimed at promoting an 
appropriate socio-economic approach of FIs sales strategies. In other words, 
the products designed for and proposed to customers should respond to 
their socio-economic status and the content should be salient to consumers’ 
financial lifecycle. Possible criteria involved in such a process are the age and 
the composition of the households. For example, empirical research often 
suggest substantial decreases in consumption after retirement, regardless of 
income patterns and an increasing spending share in health issues.  
Relationship with the client: Reimbursement approach   
In recent years, some national regulators in the EU-28 have gone beyond the 
recommendations and provisions included in the CCD, by gradually placing 
the focus on a risk management approach of over-indebtedness not only before the 
signature of a loan agreement, but also during the repayment period. Various 
member states have adopted general recommendations on the need for FIs 
to implement processes of detection of future potential over-indebted 
households and to organise an appropriate accompanying of the concerned 
households when necessary (for example, the French government adopted 
in November 2014 some recommendations requiring financial institutions to 
implement early warning systems in order to detect potential over-
indebtedness during the repayment phase).    
Until recently, the typical FI business model included five phases in 
the life of a consumer loan that lead to difficulties of repayment by the 
consumer.  
                                                   
products, such as cash, certain types of credit (e.g. home-collected credit…) and 
prepayment meters…which are better suited to their priorities for day-to-day 
money management. A consistent feature of our research findings is that low-
income consumers’ choices are based on an active weighing up of the costs and 
benefits of the products they consider available to them. Often this means having 
to make difficult trade-offs between cost and other priorities, given the limited 
choices on offer”. 
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 First, the bank performs the creditworthiness assessment of the client 
asking for a loan (in line notably with the provisions of the CCD on the 
obligation of customer creditworthiness for any consumer loan). 
 Secondly, both the lender and the borrower come to an agreement with 
specific conditions. 
 Third, even though the creditworthiness process was performed 
properly and the repayment schedule was designed in accordance 
with consumer possibilities, some unpredictable events can still occur 
and negatively affect the ability of the customer to reimburse his loan. 
For example, an accident, illness, natural disaster, separation or 
divorce, or the loss of a job can markedly weaken the financial situation 
of the customer, who is likely not to be able to commit to the repayment 
schedule.  
 Fourth, the bank transfers the file of the customer to its collection 
process in order to find solutions for recovering the owed amount.  
 Fifth, should the customer not be able to reimburse the loan, his file 
will be transferred to judicial institutions. 
The new approach promoted by some member states is that FIs should 
voluntarily investigate the risk of over-indebtedness of their customers 
before it materialises. As such, FIs are encouraged to develop prevention 
programmes before entering phase four. This early-stage detection system is 
perfectly in line with the political objectives of detecting and curbing debt 
stress, both at microeconomic and macroeconomic levels. Within this 
framework, lenders are able to identify vulnerable customers before their 
financial difficulties become insurmountable and solutions could be found 
even before initiating the collection phase. Some FIs have developed two 
different ways of detecting vulnerable customers: 
- a scoring system identifies the likelihood of a customer missing a 
repayment within a given period and  
- a phone service available to all customers in case of financial 
difficulties. 
Resulting from these two processes, the bank can provide a service 
whose main aims are to confirm whether or not the targeted customers are 
financially vulnerable and to offer personalised solutions where needed. In 
that context, the initiation of a collection phase, often costly in terms of 
resources for both lenders and borrowers, could be avoided. 
Nevertheless, no matter how beneficial such a system may be, the 
question remains as to how to encourage and promote such practices in 
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credit markets. Indeed, binding regulations may trigger negative outcomes 
that outweigh any positive effects. This is because such interventions can 
affect the normal risk-taking processes that are integral to all lending 
formats, reducing product diversity and choice and also potentially reducing 
credit supply. In addition, the implementation of early detection processes 
may spark higher than optimal costs, especially for smaller loans. Should 
these costs be partially or fully passed through to the interest rate on the loan, 
some borrowers will in the end also be penalised. Borrowers with healthy 
finances during the whole life of the loan may even be the big losers in such 
a system, as they would indirectly subsidise to a certain extent the detection 
of the borrowers who may encounter financial difficulties during the 
reimbursement period.  
The present Task Force considers that the best way to encourage the 
implementation of early-detection processes is to use regulatory incentives as 
opposed to binding rules. For instance, tax deductibility or processes that ease 
the impact of CRD4 (liquidity ratios and capital ratios) conditional on the 
implementation of effective and satisfactory early-detection processes might 
be usefully explored. 
Recommendations 4.2 
 4.2.1 Place further emphasis on the prevention of over-indebtedness 
in the European policy design, notably by encouraging the set-up of 
early-stage detection of potential over-indebtedness in order to 
alleviate collection/juridical costs of FIs and arrears and perhaps 
bankruptcy costs of households. 
 4.2.2 Use regulatory incentives (such as tax deductibility, or some 
easing in the implementation of CRD4 price-based ratios, etc.). This 
would avoid the significant risk of binding regulation leading to 
negative outcomes that could easily outweigh any positive effects.   
4.3 A possible alternative approach to consumer protection: 
External assessment?  
Another line of action towards consumer protection may be the use of 
external ratings to assess the responsible lending practices of FIs.39  
                                                   
39 This practice has been extensively used in food and consumer products, especially 
with the eco-labels providing sustainability measurement directed at consumers to 
help them take environmental concerns into account when shopping. 
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For the case of consumer loans, a potential rating may focus on two different 
aspects of the services: 
- “Process focus”: the labelling process could assess the quality of the 
processes used by FIs to implement responsible lending practices. This 
can include, for example, the commitment of the organisation to 
deliver clear and transparent information to the customers, an 
appropriate training of the sales employees, a pertinent process to 
detect risks of over-indebtedness during the whole life of the loan, etc. 
To a certain extent, such ratings may result from a combination of 
information disclosure and responsible lending approaches. In that 
context, the labeller indeed certifies that the lender is acting in a 
responsible way and this information is disclosed to the consumer 
through a marking. 
- “Result focus”: while the “process focus” option places the emphasis 
on the quality of the means used by the FIs to provide loans, the “result 
focus” essentially considers results. It is therefore tempting to oppose 
an “obligation of means” to an “obligation of results”. The latter can 
rely on different ratios to assess the performance of the organisation: 
the default rate, the proportion of customers in arrears, etc. One of the 
main difficulties of the “result focus” approach resides in the 
methodological inconsistencies in the definition of default and/or 
arrears, not only across countries, but also across companies. 
Furthermore, the rate of default or any other ratios aimed at reflecting 
the share of customers having difficulties in reimbursing their loans 
can depend markedly on the macroeconomic environment in which 
the lenders operate. In order to remain effective, the labeller would 
need to update its criteria on a regular basis, which seems rather 
counterproductive. Finally, the consumer loans market is segmented 
into types of products and customers. Some groups of products imply 
greater risks, hereby resulting in higher rates of arrears. Therefore, the 
implementation of labelling practices based on “result focus” methods 
could lead to a marked impoverishment of service choices on the 
market, as different classes of products would enter directly into 
competition through biased criteria of comparison.    
External ratings on the responsible lending practices of FIs could 
generate different advantages, especially by addressing some key market 
dysfunctions. For customers, such a practice should contribute to alleviating 
the risk of moral hazard sparked by information asymmetries in the credit 
markets. Furthermore, the choice made by customers should be eased with 
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a consistent methodology of assessment across the FIs providing consumer 
loans. Should such ratings include the assessment of practices of FIs in line 
with the respect for the environment or with a better quality of life for the 
population, this should also contribute to the achievement of Europe 2020 
objectives, by, for example, helping consumers take environmental concerns 
into account when choosing a loan.  
As regards the lenders, external ratings on responsible lending can 
enable them to reduce their costs when they attempt to highlight the benefits 
of their financial services when compared to those of their competitors. 
Indeed, providing such benefits typically induce some costs and FIs need to 
convince consumers to pay a higher price than for competing services on the 
market.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of external ratings systems can 
trigger different risks and disadvantages, and such an option should be 
carefully assessed before any further policy involvement. First of all, the 
structure of the agencies providing these ratings remains one of the key 
issues. Should it be a centralised public body, a purely private organisation 
in competition with others or a hybrid centralised organisation, owned for 
example by a consortium of FIs, one can question the independence of the 
external assessor from the lender and therefore the credibility of the assessor.  
Secondly, the effectiveness of external ratings as a communication tool 
can be questioned. For the food industry, the use of labels by customers has 
often been revealed as inconsistent. In addition, some customers may lack 
interest in the information provided by the label. Even though the consumer 
may be interested in the rating, many customers might find the use of ratings 
difficult as they contain too much information, much of it is not understood, 
is confusing and is poorly presented. Finally, should the customers not trust 
the body providing the ratings on the responsible lending dimension of FIs, 
such external ratings might even be counterproductive. The reputation and 
credibility of the external assessor are therefore essential to ensuring a 
proper rating system.  
Last but not least, the assessment of FIs and some important parts of 
their internal processes is already performed by supervisors and controls 
have been reinforced markedly in the context of the recent new regulatory 
packages, especially at European level. Some risks of regulatory overlap 
would be quite likely, triggering in the end non-optimal compliance costs for 
FIs and higher interest rates for consumers in case of significant pass-
through. 
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Therefore, in the current state of play, the positive role that external 
assessment can play in credit markets remains rather hypothetical and 
further studies will be needed before deciding if this would become a viable 
option.   
Recommendation 4.3 
 4.3.1 Assess the possibility of conducting a survey on the different 
practices in terms of external assessment of responsible lending 
practices of FIs in European member states.  
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CHAPTER 5. INTERACTION BETWEEN 
INTEGRATION, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
AND GROWTH 
he motivation for regional integration in Europe has most of the time 
been political rather than economic (Kleimeier et al., 2007) and the 
long-term objective, as originally advocated by Jean Monnet, has been 
to create the “United States of Europe”. However, the means to achieve that 
goal have been most of the time economic: for instance, the Treaty of Rome 
of 1957 identifies in Article 2 the creation of a unified economic area with a 
common market as the task of the Community.  
Regarding the economic benefits of further integration, the European 
institutions have generally remained vague, especially in respect of financial 
markets. For example, in the Article 20 of the Lisbon European Council 
(2000) dealing with “Efficient and integrated financial markets”, the word 
“transparent” has been preferred to “integrated”: “Efficient and transparent 
[not integrated] financial markets foster growth and employment by better 
allocation of capital and reducing its costs”. All in all, the concept of 
integration has generally been analysed as an objective rather than as a 
driver for stability, consumer protection or growth in the retail financial 
markets. 
However, notably in the context of the ongoing implementation of the 
banking union, a new approach has recently been adopted in the concept of 
financial integration, which emphasised the need to raise the “quality” of the 
financial integration in the euro area (Draghi, 2014). In Mario Draghi’s view, the 
incomplete financial integration achieved before the crisis, with highly 
integrated interbank markets and largely fragmented retail banking, made it 
susceptible to systemic crises. The market share of cross-border lending 
between monetary and financial institutions was indeed much greater than 
that of households’ loans (see Figure 5.1) and, despite a pronounced decrease 
in recent years, remains more than 20 pp higher. It is also worth mentioning 
that cross-border lending is much higher for non-financial corporations 
(average of 6.3% between 2003 and 2013), mirroring the ability of large 
multinationals to contract loans all over the EA-12. The assessment is similar 
with capital markets, where the share of cross-border activities for corporate 
and government bonds and equities is on average much greater than 20%. 
T
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Two conclusions can be made from the observations of these figures. 
Firstly, household credit is national at best, even within the euro area 
(Lannoo, 2008).40 Secondly, the integration gap between interbank markets 
and household credits can lead to marked disequilibria, as was the case in 
the years leading up to the financial crisis when FIs used short-term and 
debt-based funding to increase lending to favoured domestic sectors such as 
real estate, especially in Ireland and Spain (Draghi, 2014). 
Figure 5.1 Cross-border provisions of financial services in the EA12 (in %) 
 
Notes: NFC stands for non-financial corporations. FIs stands for monetary and financial 
institutions. 
Sources: ECB, ECRI calculations. 
As a result, one of the objectives of the ECB and the banking union for 
the coming years is to enhance the integration of the household credit sectors 
all over the EU, notably via the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). 
Further integration admittedly will trigger destabilising effects (contagion 
and higher risk-taking resulting from asymmetric information problems 
associated with cross-border lending); however, in a context where both the 
                                                   
40 Pushing the reasoning even further, household credit is even local rather than 
national, hereby reflecting the nature of the market for goods funded through 
consumer credit. Indeed, most households applying for consumer loans intend to 
acquire a product whose sales point is located in the same region. To a certain extent, 
the development of the digital economy may open up the market for goods and 
encourage further European integration of consumer credit markets. 
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retail and the interbank markets are well integrated, the stabilising effects of 
a quality integration (increased portfolio diversification, which will allow FIs 
to reduce their exposure to domestic shocks, and improved allocative 
efficiency) are expected to overcome the destabilising ones.   
In this context, most of the current debate on integration and banking 
union focuses on the related benefits in terms of stability for the European 
financial sector and the overall economy and nothing or little is said about 
the effect of further integration on consumer protection and credit growth in 
the EU. The positive impact on growth and consumer rights is generally 
expressed as a simple statement and, to our knowledge, no impact study 
quantifying or even demonstrating this positive effect has been published. It 
could be argued that a process of financial integration based on stability 
could be beneficial for both consumers and FIs, due to the downside risks of 
financial crisis. However, excessive emphasis on stability in an integrated 
financial sector could also result in unreasonable rigidities, which might 
hamper business initiatives. Such a paradigm is likely to impede markedly 
the pace of financial innovations, thereby limiting the number of choices for 
households and hindering credit growth opportunities. 
Therefore one of the objectives of this chapter is to contribute to move 
the debate on banking union and integration further towards the question of 
dynamic credit markets and consumer protection. As such, the chapter will 
first determine what an integrated retail financial market is, what are the 
implications for both consumers and lenders and how it can be achieved. 
The definition of this theoretical integrated retail financial market will then 
help assess what are the best forms of integration. The chapter will show that 
the policy objective of significant cross-border lending makes sense in 
household retail lending only if certain very restrictive preconditions have 
been fulfilled. Rising integration through the “mergers and acquisitions” 
channel seems more probable, but can spark different risks such as 
reorganisation costs, etc. From these analyses, this chapter will be able to 
draw up some recommendations. 
5.1 Law of unique price: Implications for consumer 
protection and credit growth 
Definitions and implication for lenders and borrowers 
In its Financial Integration Monitor 2005, the European Commission adopted 
the following definition for the concept of financial integration:  
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Financial integration is a process, driven by market forces, in which 
separate national financial markets gradually enter into competition 
with each other and eventually become one financial market, 
characterised by converging prices, product supply and converging 
efficiency/profitability among the financial services providers. 
When opting for this definition, European regulators drew inspiration 
from the economic concept commonly known as the “law of one price”: this 
means that when inter-market trading starts, observed differentials in the 
prices of commodities and services will tend to diminish and eventually 
disappear given the absence of “any abnormal shocks”41 to the system and 
the existence of individuals’ capability and willingness to engage in 
arbitrage42 (Ayadi, 2011).  
This definition of integration needs to be approached in a dynamic 
context. Recurrent external shocks (caused by new technologies, tax policies, 
etc.) can affect household domestic retail credit markets in a differentiated 
manner and spark disequilibria in the short term, notably resulting in rising 
spreads between similar financial products across domestic markets. 
Provided that FIs have the will and the ability to engage in arbitrage all over 
the EU, the markets will naturally move towards a new equilibrium in a 
medium- or long-term horizon. As such, during this period of transition, 
opportunities of growth and profits for FIs are recurrent. Of course, the 
speed of convergence will depend on the willingness and ability of FIs to go 
into this direction, or in other words, whether such integration processes 
make business sense.  
On the consumer side, the European Commission’s definition of 
financial integration implies that for a given household and financial 
product, the price would be similar in all the EU-28. This policy objective, which 
is already stated for credits to non-financial corporations, especially to SMEs, could 
be a marked contributor to consumer protection, since it would result in the 
achievement of fair pricing for all EU households, or at least would imply 
downside risks of over-pricing. Against the backdrop of a fully functional 
                                                   
41 “Abnormal shocks” to the system are typically shocks which trigger a significant 
systemic risk and, as such, lead to very deep disequilibria, with long-term 
consequences. 
42 Arbitrage means the simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset in order to profit 
from a difference in the price. It is a trade that profits by exploiting price differences 
of identical or similar financial instruments, on different markets or in different 
forms. Arbitrage exists as a result of market inefficiencies; it provides a mechanism 
to ensure prices do not deviate substantially from fair value for long periods of time. 
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single market, a creditworthy household that could not borrow from a 
domestic bank would borrow directly from a bank in another member states 
instead (Coeuré, 2014). However, once again, this view should be placed in 
a dynamic context: external shocks can distort the credit markets, leading to 
rising spreads and the objective of consistent pricing across households will 
be gradually achieved before another shock occurs. 
Necessary conditions 
The conditions necessary to the achievement of equilibria in line with the law 
of unique price are numerous and the challenges of implementing these 
conditions seem tremendous. The Commission’s definition is based on the 
postulate of perfect competition on the supply side. This would imply 
perfect mobility, perfect information, the absence of any situations of price-
making (triggered by any form of oligopoly), etc., all over the EU. The 
implementation of the SSM with consistent cross-country requirements, 
compliance and rules should help significantly in this respect, notably by 
reducing hidden barriers to cross-border activity linked to national 
preferences (Draghi, 2014).43  
Regarding demand (which is not considered in the definition), this 
equilibrium also implies perfect information and mobility. By definition, as 
the demand for household credit is extremely scattered and no form of 
concentration can be observed, a high quality of the information and a high 
mobility of household demand are essential to achieve such an equilibrium.  
Nevertheless, overall, very strong barriers remain in the EU to 
achieving the necessary conditions for quality integration, resulting in 
continuous and significant risks of market distortions. In theory, there are 
two main types of barriers – natural and structural – which can affect both 
demand and supply of household retail loans. 
Firstly, natural barriers refer to geographic proximity,44 the differences 
in languages and cultural differences, etc.45 Most of these barriers are very 
                                                   
43 Issues such as the protection of national champions or supervisory ring-fencing of 
liquidity will not be relevant anymore. 
44 As such, according to Benoît Coeuré (2014), “in the euro area today, it is the 
location of borrowers, rather than their creditworthiness per se, that matters most 
for access to finance, in particular for SMEs”. 
45 Among the cultural differences directly affecting consumer credit markets, the 
heterogeneity in “commitment behaviour” across member states may involve 
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difficult to overcome unless substantial changes are made in consumer 
preferences and trends and commercial strategies. Nevertheless, typically, 
the change in commercial strategies has a very significant fixed cost. These 
barriers concern both the lender and the borrower: for example, in the case 
of direct cross-border lending, the former most likely needs skills in foreign 
languages to satisfy foreign customers, which can be costly, while the latter 
might be uncomfortable with the practices of the foreign seller or suffer from 
some sense of insecurity, as he is not totally sure about his rights in this 
foreign country.  
Secondly, structural barriers can be overcome either by market players 
or by regulators. They concern all the fixed costs incurred in cross-border 
expansion owing to different regulations, reporting, tax systems and any 
other impediments.46 For example, differentiated requirements and 
creditworthiness decision-making systems across countries can intensify 
complexity and therefore increase costs for both lenders and customers 
engaged in cross-border lending.  
Some of the structural barriers are partly shaped by natural ones. For 
instance, differentiated cultural preferences could trigger heterogeneous 
behavioural biases across member states, resulting in differentiated policy 
responses. Owing to cultural differences, the framing of information can 
vary markedly across countries and can require different consumer 
protection policy approaches. The differences in cultural preferences and 
habits have also led to different legal systems: countries inheriting Latin legal 
systems rely rather on codes, while the Anglo-Saxon type of legal system is 
based further on jurisprudence. Therefore, the barriers resulting from the 
different legal systems can combine both structural and natural elements.   
For the case of retail financial services, integration remains elusive 
because financial products reflect the legal, tax and regulatory systems under 
which they are executed and these systems differ widely across member 
states (Ayadi, 2011). The integration process in financial services is typically 
founded on the interaction between minimum harmonisation, mutual 
recognition and home country control. Such principles have often produced 
                                                   
different types of pricing and contracts and may be a barrier very difficult to 
overcome for a foreign FMI.  
46 For example, regulations regarding usury differ widely across member states and 
some financial products available in some member states could hardly be developed 
in some others. 
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mixed results because of the major obstacles they have encountered.47 The 
combination of natural and structural barriers indeed cause the 
implementation process of EU law to be often overly complex, sometimes 
resulting in a framework where regulation differentiation across EU member 
states is even higher than before the EU decided to legislate in a specific matter.  
As such, some voices question the harmonisation benefits of the 
Consumer Credit Directive. The report on CCD implementation published 
by the Commission on 14 May 2014 partly confirms this view, notably by 
revealing different levels of implementation, numerous exceptions, poor 
enforcement of mandatory information disclosure, etc. Therefore, the report 
recommends better enforcement and further exchanges of experiences 
between member states in order to enhance a better harmonisation. Another 
possible approach would be to conduct an impact assessment whose main 
purpose is to compare the level of European harmonisation in consumer 
credit rules between “before the domestic implementations of the CCD” and 
“after the domestic implementations of the CCD”. Such assessments, which 
could be conducted for other European regulations, would reveal the real 
harmonisation impact of the Directive and would therefore help reinforce 
the overall coherence of the single market strategy for the case of retail 
financial services. 
Finally, in order to contribute to an informed and appropriate debate 
on the effects of steps aimed at enhancing financial market integration, 
mono-causal indicators based on prices or quantities alone might not be 
sufficient. To a certain extent, policies that promote “optimal integration” do 
not necessarily aim to maximise the amounts of cross-border business or to 
approach as much as it is possible the law of unique price, but they need to 
interpret regulatory effects against the background of secondary effects. The 
process and costs of reaching a new equilibrium must not be left aside. 
For example, each new piece of legislation will necessarily have 
uneven effects on the different banking markets in the EU, depending on the 
vicinity of the legal situation of the respective banking sector to the new 
rules. Thus the cost to adapt to the new situation will be divided unequally 
                                                   
47 Minimum harmonisation can lead to indefinite negotiation processes, which often 
result in the watering down of the main provisions and leave room for national 
discretion. Mutual recognition has its virtues and deficiencies, but in practice it is 
hard to satisfy home and host country supervisors, particularly when the 
subsidiarity principle ought to be respected. Home country control can work when 
institutions enter into a foreign market through a branch but not through a 
subsidiary (Ayadi, 2011).    
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across Europe. It remains an open question what the optimum is in this 
regard – for example, on vitality and productivity of the respective banking 
sector. 
Furthermore, if business models of suppliers need to be adapted due 
to a changing regulatory landscape, it may be the case that competitive banks 
cease to be a counterforce on the domestic market. In the long run that may 
damage the intensity of competition and thus customer choice and the 
quality of supply. 
Indexes to measure financial integration 
Finally, among the available indexes to measure the level of integration over 
time, European policy-makers and some studies often refer to the cross-
border standard deviation of FIs interest rates on retail loans (CBSD). The 
data produced by this index (see Figure 5.2) tend to confirm the negative 
impact of the financial crisis on the intensity of integration of the non-
financial corporations’ credits, housing loans and consumer loans. At first, 
the impact seems to be less significant for the latter; nevertheless, the related 
time series has moved along a noticeable upward trend since mid-2008. In 
other words, consumer credit markets have gradually drawn away from the 
assumption of the law of unique price in recent years, while they remained 
at a stable short distance from this assumption in the years preceding 2006.  
The main advantage of CBSD indexes is that they are based on data 
published with very high periodicity and relatively consistent 
methodologies. They provide a synthesis of the level of macroeconomic 
integration of these different retail banking segments. Nevertheless, they 
also present some significant disadvantages. One of the most important is 
the inability of these indexes to control for the economic developments in 
member states. Indeed, the law of unique price implies that for a given 
household and financial product, the price is similar in all the EU-28. The 
average quality of the creditworthiness of households in a given country is 
highly correlated with the economic situation of this country: poor 
macroeconomic performances with rising unemployment and depreciating 
collateral values are likely to reduce the average quality of creditworthiness 
assessments, leading to rising interest rates.  
Conversely, better economic prospects are likely to boost the average 
quality of creditworthiness assessment, resulting in contracting interest 
rates. Therefore, a microeconomic approach notably based on surveys with FIs or 
households could give a better estimate on the evolution of integration across 
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domestic credit markets (although such a methodology might be costly and 
provide results with wider periodicity than with CBSD).48   
Figure 5.2 Cross-border standard deviation of FIs interest rates on retail loans 
 
Source: ECB. 
Recommendations 5.1 
 5.1.1 Promote research on the impact of further financial integration 
on consumer protection and growth and on the determination of an 
optimal level of integration, thereby assessing in particular the 
implied costs of further integration. 
                                                   
48 Currently, the Bank Lending Survey published by the ECB provides quarterly data 
on the margin of two groups of consumer loans: average loans and riskier loans. 
Based on this methodology, perhaps it could be possible to have data on the 
tightening or easing of lending standards (at best, data on the value of interest rates) 
of several classes of consumer loans: for example, low risk, medium risk and high 
risk.   
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 5.1.2 Develop different channels to enhance integration of retail 
financial markets and assess which ones are the most effective. 
 5.1.3 Develop impact assessments whose main purpose is to compare 
the level of European harmonisation in consumer credit rules 
between “before the implementation of the CCD” and “after the 
implementation of the CCD”; such methodologies could be applied 
to other segments of retail finance and even beyond. 
 5.1.4 Highlight the limits of the indicators of cross-border standard 
deviation of FIs interest rates on retail loans (CBSD) to measure the 
intensity of integration in household credits. 
 5.1.5 Promote a microeconomic approach notably based on surveys 
with FIs or households could give a better estimate on the evolution 
of integration across domestic consumer credit markets. 
5.2 Cross-border lending: Myth or reality? 
In the European institutions, cross-border lending has remained one of the 
key topics of the integration of retail finance. For example, the Study on the 
functioning of the consumer credit market in Europe funded by the 
European Commission (2013) includes a large survey on cross-border 
lending. Yet, the achievement of large-scale cross-border lending requires 
very specific conditions which are far from being fulfilled.  
Cross-border lending occurs when a borrower contracts a loan with a 
lender, whose license is registered in another euro area country. Statistically, 
the basic principle to be accounted as cross-border lending is that the asset 
of the bank and the corresponding liability of the household are both 
registered in different member states. 
Typically, there are two main types of cross-border lending regarding 
retail household credit:  
(1) lending through branches in other member states; and 
(2) direct cross-border lending (defined as: the consumer credit is booked 
in an institution’s home country and the borrower resides in another 
member state). 
Overall, in the last decade, the market share of cross-border lending in 
the segment of household retail loans has remained extremely low in the EA-
12 and has even moved along a downward path since 2007 (see Figure 5.3). 
In 2013, the distribution across EA-12 member states shows that only small 
open economies, such as Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, registered 
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noticeable cross-border lending (see Figure 5.4). All the other economies 
recorded levels well below 1%. The specific case of Luxembourg, where the market 
share of cross-border lending reached a stunning 31.6% in 2013, can be explained 
by a very high international mobility of workers. Many workers in Luxembourg 
are indeed residents in a neighbouring country: while their residences are 
located in Belgium, France or Germany, they work in Luxembourg and are 
likely to have their financial wealth partly or entirely managed in FIs located 
in Luxembourg. Against this backdrop, contracting a loan abroad is common 
practice. Luxembourg is a perfect case study to analyse the necessary 
framework for large-scale cross-border lending. However, its structure can 
hardly be applied to the whole EU-28.   
No consistent data are available across countries on cross-border 
lending exclusively for consumer credit. Nevertheless, some EA-12 countries 
such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands published data with robust 
methodologies on these issues and confirm the low share of this type of 
integration: in 2013, cross-border lending in consumer credit reached 12.8% 
in the former (vs. 31.6% for the whole household credit activities) and 1.6% 
in the Netherlands. According to “the study on the functioning of the 
consumer credit market in Europe” funded by the European Commission 
(2013), survey-based data show a figure of 1.4% in the whole EU-27 for the 
year 2011.   
 
Figure 5.3 Cross-border lending in retail 
household credit (in % of total 
outstanding household credit, EA-12) 
Figure 5.4 Cross-border lending in retail 
household credit (in % of total 
outstanding household credit, in 2013) 
 
Source: ECRI calculations based on ECB data. 
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The impact of both natural and structural barriers seems exacerbated 
by cross-border lending. Some policy-makers expected that the introduction 
of a common currency would limit the negative impact of both natural and 
structural barriers and give a boost to this type of financial practice, but it 
has never really happened, despite the efforts of the ECB. The main reason 
behind this failure is the inability to harmonise markedly tax and regulatory 
systems across the EU. Therefore, the development of cross-border lending 
would make sense as a policy objective only if a certain degree of regulatory 
and tax harmonisation is achieved.  
Regarding regulatory harmonisation, some policies may have a 
significant impact on the integration of consumer credit through the channel 
of cross-border lending, although they are not specifically designed for retail 
financial services. For example, the increasing opportunities offered by 
digital technologies and the commitment of the new Commission to set a 
European digital market in the coming years may have significant 
integrating effects on consumer credit markets. Indeed, the expanding 
digital economy may gradually alleviate the negative impact of geographic 
barriers on cross-border lending, through the development of distribution 
channels covering the whole European territory for both goods and loans. 
As such, both digital banking and digital shopping of goods should help 
integrate further the retail banking segments, including household ones.   
Recommendation 5.2 
 5.2.1 Promote the idea that the development of cross-border lending 
would make sense as a policy objective only if a certain degree of 
regulatory and tax harmonisation is achieved. 
5.3 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
Definition and state of play 
Foreign FIs can consolidate through two processes: on one hand, two foreign 
FIs can combine to form a new bank (merger); on the other hand, one bank 
can purchase a foreign bank and no new bank is formed (acquisition). In the 
current context, integration in retail banking via cross-border M&A is 
promoted by European regulators, notably because there is intrinsic value 
for retail FIs in being physically present in local markets as it lowers the costs 
of monitoring (Coeuré, 2013). Retail banking integration in the form of cross-
border M&A can improve allocative efficiency by increasing the distance 
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between the main shareholders of a bank and the vested interests in the 
country where the bank operates.  
Regarding cross-border M&As in the consumer credit market, the 
European market has observed a certain form of disintegration since the 
financial crisis of 2008-09, in line with the developments observed in many 
other banking segments. Several FIs have adopted refocusing or retreating 
strategies in the aftermath of the financial crisis: Capital One, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland Consumer Finance, Fortis Consumer Finance, KBC Consumer 
Finance, General Electric Consumer Finance, Citibank, LaSer, MBNA, etc., 
and only a few have entered the European market since then (Crédit Mutuel, 
Tesco Personal Finance). As a consequence, while the European consumer 
finance competitive mapping in 2005-06 typically showed five pan-European 
leaders and numerous European challengers, the disintegration process 
occurring in recent years led to a dramatic evolution in the European 
competitive environment, with only two pan-European leaders and several 
former European challengers following refocusing or retreating strategies.  
Impact of regulatory systems on the intensity of cross-border M&As 
The objective of the European regulators to reverse this process of 
disintegration through cross-border M&As requires an analysis of the main 
drivers behind cross-border M&As. Among the different factors driving the 
propensity of FIs to engage in cross-border M&As, quality and regulatory 
systems play a key role. Two theories compete in the literature about the 
impact of the quality and regulatory systems on cross-border M&As: the 
“outcome hypothesis” and the “governance hypothesis” (Manchin, 2004).  
The “outcome hypothesis” predicts more intense cross-border M&A 
activities in countries where the investor protection is better (Rossi & Volpin, 
2002). There are two main reasons behind this positive relationship. Firstly, 
strong institutions entail better funds availability. Secondly, efficient, better 
functioning firms might be more attractive for acquirers than firms with 
lower levels of investor protection and efficiency. 
The “governance hypothesis” suggests more cross-border M&As 
between FIs with different levels of investor protection. In this context, 
contrary to the “outcome hypothesis”, FIs active in corporate controls targets 
FIs with rather poor investor protection and poor governance. The main 
intuition behind this approach is that an inefficiently managed firm becomes 
a target due to the expected increase in its value after restructuring. In 
addition, the improved governance of the merged foreign bank might 
encourage policy-makers of the country to reinforce investor protection 
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rules. The “governance hypothesis” approach can apply to the numerous 
cross-border M&As that occurred in the Central European and Eastern 
countries at the end of 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s, before the 
political integration of these economies into the European Union. In mid-
2000s, for example, retail FIs were mostly owned by EU-15 or US FIs in 
Poland. Such a process occurred because EU-15 and US FIs could easily 
increase the value of these financial organisations after restructuring and a 
positive change in governance. As a result, more harmonised regulatory 
systems do not consistently lead to further cross-border M&As.    
Impact of economic developments on the intensity of cross-border M&As 
The research suggests, however, that the economic environment positively 
influences the pace of cross-border M&As in a consistent manner. Periods of 
economic growth trigger more business opportunities for FIs, resulting in 
further incentives for cross-border M&As. Conversely, economic recession 
or weakening generally spark disintegration processes, mirroring the wish 
of FIs to reposition themselves in their core domestic market. According to 
Daluiso (2013), in the sub-period 2009-13, the share of deals involving only 
FIs within the euro area increased from 50% of the total to 56%; however, the 
jump was mostly driven by a marked increase in the share of deals involving 
only FIs within the same euro area country, which went from 33% to 45%. 
On the other hand, the geographical distribution of deals in the US has not 
changed. In other words, with the financial crisis and the ensuing very poor 
economic performance of the euro area economy since then (in 2010-13, the 
cumulative growth in real GDP reached +2.4% in the euro area (vs. +9.4% in 
2004-07) and +9.0% in the US (vs. +12.1% in 2004-07)), the borders of the bank 
M&As in Europe have shrunk behind the national frontiers, while the same 
did not occur in the US.  
As such, promoting cross-border M&As in a context of economic 
stagnation seems hypothetical. The return of economic growth, rather than 
further harmonised rules in the euro area, seems to be the prerequisite for further 
integration through cross-border M&As. In a context of a virtuous economic 
circle, economic growth and increasing business opportunities favour 
consolidation processes across the euro area and a better allocation of 
resources, which, in turn, contribute positively to economic growth (see 
Figure 5.1). 
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Recommendations 5.3 
 5.3.1 Promote the idea that the prerequisite for further integration 
through cross-border M&A is economic growth.   
 5.3.2 Promote research on the main regulatory drivers behind cross-
border M&As. 
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CHAPTER 6. DIGITAL BANKING AND 
NEW/RELATED BUSINESS MODELS 
n the past decade, the European economy has become increasingly 
digital, as organisations and individuals have relied more and more on 
digital technologies such as the internet or smartphones. Given that 
banking revenue is generated by an older and wealthier population, it took 
more time than in some other sectors to reach critical mass, but in the end, 
the banking sector is no exception. According to McKinsey (2015), the share 
of digital disruption in banking revenues stood at 1% before 2010, reached 
11% in 2014 and is expected to achieve broadly 60-65% by 2020.49 In 2018, in 
Europe, around half of new banking revenues will be captured by sales via 
online/mobile channels. 
This rapid evolution triggers numerous regulatory questions on the 
technologies used in the process and on the new entrants using business 
models primarily based on digital elements. First of all, the regulatory 
framework of these technologies has been progressively adapted in order to 
facilitate business opportunities and competition among suppliers, as well 
as to reinforce consumer protection and to accelerate the set-up of a single 
digital market. Indeed, these new technologies spark not only new 
opportunities for growth in the banking sector, but also new risks (in terms 
of security, privacy, etc.).  
As regards new opportunities, the digital technologies should, on one 
hand, bring a considerable amount of workable data to FIs and, on the other 
hand, ease markedly credit processes by accelerating decision-making and 
credit approval/management. The former opportunity raises questions 
about the use of the collected data and is related to privacy concerns. Such 
concerns were notably addressed in a previous ECRI Task Force on 
“Towards Better Use of Credit Reporting in Europe” (Pyykkö & Steinbauer, 
2013). In the present Task Force, discussions were rather on the latter 
opportunity and some debates have been developed on the regulatory 
question of electronic identification, especially through the design and 
implementation of the eIDAS in the EU-28 and its implications for the 
banking sector. 
                                                   
49 According to McKinsey, digital disruption in banking revenues reflects the share 
of new revenue captured via the online/mobile channels.  
I
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The business opportunities created by the digital technologies, 
combined with the persistent mistrust of the public towards the traditional 
FIs, have favoured the emergence of new entrants with new business models 
and new channels to fund consumer loans. The appearance of these new 
entrants, based notably on the business models of peer-to-peer lending and 
crowdfunding, have also benefited from lower regulatory requirements than 
traditional FIs, both for their structure and the services they provide. This 
state of play raises two main types of issues. On the one hand, lower 
regulatory constraints for new entrants should trigger lower costs for these 
organisations: this may lead to competition issues. Constraining regulations 
are indeed not equally applied across the whole spectrum of household retail 
finance and, to a certain extent, this could harm the position of traditional 
FIs with respect to their ability to compete on equal and fair terms.  
On the other hand, the completely new nature of the new entrants 
could spark new risks, both in financial terms and in consumer protection 
terms. The very original structure of these new entrants, the poor aggregate 
data on these businesses (market shares, financial risks, etc.) and the new 
nature of the services provided are a challenge to the regulator and questions 
remain on the best regulatory approach at European level. 
Therefore, the first section of this chapter will place the focus on the 
new digital technologies, with an emphasis on electronic identification, 
while the possible regulatory options for two of the main new business 
models in the banking sector, crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending, will 
be analysed in the second section.   
6.1 New technologies: Questioning electronic identification 
In a speech addressed to the European Parliament on 15 July 2014, Jean-
Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, emphasised that 
the creation of a connected digital single market can generate up to €250 
billion of additional growth in Europe during the next Commission’s 
mandate. At the core of this digital agenda is the implementation of the 
Electronic identification and trust services (eIDAS). This regulation, which 
entered into force on 17 September 2014 and will be gradually implemented 
in the coming years, aims at strengthening the EU Single Market by boosting 
trust and convenience in secure and seamless cross-border electronic 
transactions. 
 
 
TOWARDS A BALANCED CONTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD CREDIT TO THE ECONOMY | 91 
There are three implied objectives behind this regulation: 
- ensuring mutual recognition of e-identification means,50 
- enhancing electronic trust services (e-signatures, e-seals, e-registered 
delivery services, time stamping and website authentication) 51 and 
- promoting electronic documents.  
For the case of the consumer loan market and other types of household 
credit markets, this new regulation should address some market 
dysfunctions resulting from very complex procedures of identification, as 
well as from security and reliability issues. Fast and reliable electronic 
identification should be in the interest of both lenders and borrowers. Firstly, 
it should positively contribute to the proper functioning of the distance 
credit market, as the eIDAS should facilitate online seamless consumer 
experiences without face-to-face verification.  
As regards the question of cross-border lending discussed in chapter 
4, a similar process of electronic identification accepted all over the EU 
should help limit the negative effects of some natural and structural barriers. 
With consistent electronic identification in the whole EU, the problem of 
geographic distance could be partially resolved, while some of the costs 
involved in cross-border expansion for FIs could be reduced. Nevertheless, 
such positive effects on the development of cross-border lending will remain 
marginal should some other barriers not be progressively removed, such as 
differentiated requirements and creditworthiness decision-making systems 
across countries and very diverse domestic tax systems. The eIDAS could 
also contribute to slightly limit the negative effect of these other barriers by 
facilitating the access of FIs to local credit-rating of customers and contact 
with public administrations (tax agencies). Therefore, these different positive 
effects of the eIDAS on cross-border lending make sense only if the EU-28 
can implement their interoperability across the different organisations, FIs, 
public authorities, etc., and enhance cooperation between member states.  
                                                   
50 The “eID” is based on four key principles: mandatory cross-border recognition 
only to access public services; full autonomy for private sector; principle of 
reciprocity relying on defined levels of assurance and interoperability; and 
cooperation between member states.  
51 The “trust services” relies on three principles: non-discrimination in courts of 
electronic trust services vis-à-vis their paper equivalent; specific legal effects 
associated with qualified trust services and non-mandatory technical standards 
ensuring presumption of compliance, implying technological neutrality.  
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Finally, reliable e-ID, e-sign, e-seal, e-registration, etc., should lead to 
lower risks for FIs. First of all, as shown by different surveys across the EU-
27, a significant share of electronic demand for credit is based on fraudulent 
motives to get cash and, as such, using fake identification. The 
implementation of the eIDAS with the mandatory use of electronic identity 
cards should contribute significantly to resolve this problem. Relying on 
trusted credentials, the electronic identification promoted by the eIDAS 
should also make it easier to meet some specific regulatory requirements 
such as those related to anti-money laundering.  
Recommendations 6.1 
 6.1.1 Promote digital processing as a channel to reinforce European 
integration of retail banking services. 
 6.1.2: Enhance the enforcement of the eIDAS at member state level.  
 6.1.3: Enhance the interoperability of the eIDAS across the different 
organisations, FIs, public authorities, etc., and cooperation between 
member states. 
 6.1.4: Avoid overly prescriptive new legislation, particularly in the 
field of electronic banking, in order to not stifle the development of 
innovative new products. Promote research on how regulation can 
achieve the optimal balance between trust and innovation. 
6.2 New business models: Crowdfunding and peer-to-peer 
lending 
Definition 
The line between peer-to-peer lending and crowdfunding is sometimes 
ambiguous. The distinction between both approaches can be made on the 
risk-sharing dimension. For the case of peer-to-peer lending, one agent 
decides to lend to another agent, without the use of an official financial 
institution as an intermediary and implies the absence of risk-sharing (all the 
risk is born by the borrower). On the other hand, the crowdfunding approach 
also implies the absence of a financial intermediary such as a bank in the loan 
to individuals; nevertheless, contrary to peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding 
involves a certain level of risk-sharing since a pool of individuals will lend 
money to the counterparty and all borrowers bear part of the whole financial 
risk.   
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Overall, there are four main types of business models relying on 
crowdfunding schemes:  
1) Donation crowdfunding 
2) Reward crowdfunding 
3) Equity crowdfunding 
4) Debt crowdfunding 
 Donation crowdfunding: Under donation crowdfunding, contributors 
fund projects, companies or causes, without receiving money or any 
other rewards in return. This business model is notably used for 
charity purposes and, due to the absence of yields or rewards, is often 
considered as the simplest form of crowdfunding.   
 Reward crowdfunding: Reward crowdfunding follows the same model 
as donation crowdfunding, yet people receive a reward in return for 
their contribution. Rewards are non-monetary. For example, people 
may receive a CD, a discount, or an opportunity to pre-order the 
product that’s being funded (sometimes called ‘solution 
crowdfunding’). 
 Debt crowdfunding (or loan crowdfunding): Debt crowdfunding is the 
first kind of investment crowdfunding, which allows individuals or 
businesses to borrow money from a group of people rather than from 
a bank. With debt crowdfunding, investors lend money to a company 
or an individual and receive interest on their investment. Ideally, 
businesses are able to get funded at a lower interest rate. Quite simply, 
debt crowdfunding functions as a quick and easy business loan, yet 
companies pay interest directly to their investors rather than to a 
bank. New entrants based on such business models are likely to be in 
direct competition with traditional providers of consumer loans. 
 Equity crowdfunding (or equity-based crowdfunding): Equity 
crowdfunding is a second type of investment crowdfunding, where 
investors receive equity or company ownership in return for their 
contribution. With equity crowdfunding, the expectation is that 
investors will receive a dividend or appreciation on their investment. 
Equity crowdfunding platforms allow businesses to raise capital 
without undergoing the costly process of an IPO (initial public 
offering). 
94 | DIGITAL BANKING AND NEW/RELATED BUSINESS MODELS 
Box 4. Trends in the UK and in the US 
Overall, financial organisations based on peer-to-peer lending (P2P) and 
crowdfunding business models still hold a marginal market share of total 
retail lending. Nevertheless, they have registered rapid growth in recent years 
and should gradually acquire noticeable market shares. According to KPMG, 
the volume of loans provided by P2P FIs in the UK increased by +74.3% 
between 2010 and 2013, while the amount remained stable for the five largest 
FIs and grew by 17.3% for challenger FIs. All in all, P2P FIs should supply 
broadly 1% of total loans by 2020 and, given the type of loans offered by P2P 
FIs, the corresponding market share of total consumer loans should be much 
above 1%. Nevertheless, no data is published yet at a European level on the 
contribution of new business models such as P2P and crowdfunding to credit 
markets. As the UK is one of the most advanced markets on these issues, 
reliable data has been regularly published on P2P and crowdfunding 
activities and can help better understand the dynamics at stake. 
First of all, regarding the type of customers using P2P platforms in the 
UK, the average age is 42 years old and 80% of borrowers are male. The 
distribution in terms of salary range is as follows: 25% earn less than €32,750, 
57% have an income between €32,750 and €65,500 and 18% earn more than 
€65,500. Secondly, for 42% of the loans, the purpose is vehicle purchase, for 
26% it concerns home improvement and for 25% the purpose is debt 
consolidation. Thirdly, in 2014, more than €700 million were lent via peer-to-
peer lending, for an average amount borrowed of €7,167 and for an average 
number of crowd lenders per loan of 201.  
Interestingly, 54% of borrowers had received an offer of a loan from a 
bank, but still chose P2P lending. Overall, the top five reasons borrowers 
chose P2P over traditional consumer credit in the UK are: 
1) Better interest rates 
2) More flexible terms, e.g. early repayment 
3) Ease of use 
4) Transparency 
5) Speed 
In the US, still according to KPMG, the average age and salary of P2P 
borrower on the Prosper platform are 46 years old and €69,241, respectively. 
The main purpose of these loans is debt consolidation and the average amount 
borrowed and interest rate payable are respectively €11,159 and 14.19%. 
Overall, the US online marketplace lending industry grew to over €5 billion 
in 2014, while total lending through Lending Club in Q3 2014 reached €1 
billion. 
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Current and forthcoming regulations 
The development of crowdfunding business models can favour financial 
innovations and, by increasing the number of choices for consumers, can 
contribute to further economic welfare. Nevertheless, in the current state of 
play, the emergence of crowdfunding activities for the purpose of funding 
projects, causes or small businesses is likely to spark three types of market 
dysfunctions. Firstly, the low regulatory pressure on these new entrants 
compared with traditional banking business models could lead to 
competition issues. Secondly, scant regulation can trigger new risks in terms 
of consumer and investor protection. Finally, one can question the impact of 
these lightly regulated activities on financial stability. Therefore, it makes 
sense to question the importance of these dysfunctions and to assess if 
further European rules might be necessary. 
Admittedly, several existing European legislative frameworks are 
likely to address some of the risks triggered by these new entrants (see Boxes 
6.1 and 6.2). Depending on the business model of the platform, different 
European regulations can indeed already apply to crowdfunding platforms 
and help alleviate some specific risks. Nevertheless, there are currently no 
European rules designed for the sole purpose of regulating crowdfunding 
platforms.  
Should the European regulator decide to legislate on that matter, (s)he 
will face significant challenges. First of all, the dynamics and the importance 
of these new entrants differ markedly across European countries. Secondly, 
to our knowledge, there are no consistent statistics collected at European 
level to reflect the developments of these new providers in the different 
member states and in Europe in general. As such, the extensive study on the 
functioning of the consumer credit market in Europe funded by the 
European Commission in 2013 stated: “While formal peer-to-peer consumer 
lending organised through intermediaries such as Ratesetter, Zopa and 
Funding Circle is subject to the CCD, such lending is not covered by the 
study due to a lack of data”.  
Thirdly, as analysed above, crowdfunding involves a different kind of 
business, implying different types of risk. Fourthly, it is currently difficult to 
assess the macroeconomic financial risks triggered by crowdfunding 
platforms. For example, crowdfunding is admittedly growing at a sustained 
pace in different European economies; however, its overall market share of 
total credit remains very low and, as such, it seems to be appropriate to 
conclude the existence of low systemic risk for the moment. Nevertheless, 
these implications on financial stability could change in the future, should 
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these innovative business models continue to grow at a steady pace. Fifthly, 
some countries, such as France and the UK, have already set a certain 
amount of rules to regulate crowdfunding platforms. The enactment of 
European legislation could then lead to potential overlaps.  
Therefore, against such a backdrop, it seems legitimate to question the 
added value of rules enacted at European level. Placing the focus on financial 
stability issues, specific European legislation might be necessary once 
banking activities based on crowdfunding business models reach a critical 
mass, resulting in possible systemic risks should these activities collapse. 
Regarding competition issues, the key goal is to assess the extent to which 
the regulatory gap is a driver of unfair competition and if this differentiation 
in regulation leads to market failure. Finally, in terms of consumer/investor 
protection, one can wonder if these new entrants can spark new types of risks 
and if these risks are sufficiently addressed by the existing European 
regulation. In other words, what types of information asymmetries are at 
stake and are there significant risks of marked moral hazard?   
Among the possible options, European or national regulators could 
either extend the scope of the current Consumer Credit Directive in order to 
include crowdfunding platforms for a certain number of provisions or set a 
completely new regulation. Should regulators opt for the second approach, 
a strong cost-benefits assessment would be necessary. 
 
Box 6.1 Regulatory framework likely to be applicable to crowd lending/peer-to-
peer lending 
Likely to be applicable to the platform Likely not applicable to platforms 
PSD (Payment Services Directive) 
E-money 
Anti-money laundering 
CRD4/CRR 
CCD (if lenders do not act in 
professional capacity) 
Mortgage Credit Directive 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
 
Box 6.2 Regulatory framework likely to be applicable to debt-based crowdfunding 
(depending on business model) 
MiFiD 
ICS 
Prospectus Directive 
Possibly AIFMD, EuVECA 
Possible PSD 
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Recommendations 6.2 
 6.2.1 Enhance the production of consistent data across the EU-28 on 
the aggregate activities of new banking business models. 
 6.2.2 Promote the enactment of a European regulation tailored to 
crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending business models once the 
market using these new business models has reached a critical mass, 
likely to spark noticeable systemic risks.  
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APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY OF 
ABBREVIATIONS 
APR Annual percentage rate  
CCD Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/EC 
CBSD Cross-border standard deviation of FI interest rates on retail 
loans 
EC European Commission 
ECB European Central Bank 
EU European Union 
eIDAS Electronic Identification and Trust Services   
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FIs Financial Institutions (includes Monetary and Financial 
Institutions and Other Financial Institutions)52   
MCD Mortgage Credit Directive 2014/17/EU 
pp Percentage points  
PCDI Private consumption to household disposable income ratio 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
                                                   
52 According to the ECB, monetary and financial institutions are financial institutions 
which together form the money-issuing sector of the euro area. These include the 
Eurosystem, resident credit institutions (as defined in EU law) and all other resident 
financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes 
for deposits from entities other than FIs and, for their own account (at least in 
economic terms), to grant credit and/or invest in securities. The latter group consists 
predominantly of money market funds. 
Still according to the ECB, other financial Institutions are corporations or quasi-
corporations other than insurance corporations and pension funds that are engaged 
mainly in financial intermediation by incurring liabilities in forms other than 
currency, deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from institutional entities 
other than FIs, in particular those engaged primarily in long-term financing, such as 
corporations engaged in financial leasing, financial vehicle corporations created to 
be holders of securitised assets, financial holding corporations, dealers in securities 
and derivatives (when dealing for their own account), venture capital corporations 
and development capital companies. 
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